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How do epistemic communities facilitate nuclear proliferation? The nuclear nonproliferation 
regime contains numerous actors exerting varying levels of influence on policy outcomes and 
state behavior. Neoliberal institutional theory emphasizes the role of sub-national groups play in 
forming policy preferences; one under-researched group is epistemic communities. Existing 
literature tends to consider only the nonproliferation action of epistemic communities, however 
this study aims to examine how these communities can facilitate and lower the cost of 
undertaking nuclear weaponization, effectively encouraging proliferation. It is especially ironic 
that the literature has ignored the facilitation effect, given that America’s decision to investigate 
nuclear weapons began with a plea from the scientific community to investigate the destructive 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The advent of nuclear weapons at the close of the Second World War represented a 
revolutionary change in the destructive capabilities of human technology. Nuclear weapons 
allowed for annihilation of man, material and environment on an unprecedented scale. The 
international community understood the need for a global nuclear non-proliferation regime 
characterized by a strong anti-proliferation and security-based mandates. President Eisenhower 
of the United States encapsulated this need in his famous “atoms for peace” speech delivered to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953 when he said “The United 
States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of 
destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.”1 Though it 
would be another 4 years until the IAEA was created, the nonproliferation/civilian-promotion 
nature of the regime was already evident in the contention between the two mandates. These 
divergent aims foreshadowed the nature of the world the IAEA would have to guard; a world 
where civilian nuclear commerce and use were to be promoted and implemented, but with 
certain safeguards to prevent the misuse of nuclear material and technology. 
 This contradictory mandate meant the nonproliferation regime would inherently be a 
balancing act between cultivating civilian nuclear use and safeguarding against weaponization. 
On one hand nuclear material and knowledge would be globally available to non-nuclear states 
albeit under regulation, on the other hand these regulated civilian markets by definition contained 
all the necessary material and knowledge to allow for weaponization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Eisenhower’s description of the future nuclear landscape was apt; we exist today in a 
world with 438 active nuclear reactors used for civilian energy,2 an estimated 15,375 nuclear 
weapons,3 and 9 overt nuclear weapon states.4 The knowledge required to undertake enrichment 
and the necessary equipment is available in an imperfectly regulated global market. Nuclear 
epistemic communities inhabit this environment, as networks of technocratic and academic 
professionals who hold knowledge considered specialized to the field of nuclear physics. These 
communities have authoritative claims to being experts in their knowledge area. It is important to 
note that epistemic communities are not comprised solely of scientists. Recent literature has 
begun to stress the importance of broadening the membership of epistemic community analysis 
away from scientists and academic focused models to include more diverse professional 
elements.5 
The majority of international relations scholarship on the behavior of nuclear epistemic 
communities has focused on their nonproliferation activities,6 with surprisingly little inquiry into 
proliferation facilitation by epistemic communities. How do epistemic communities influence 
proliferation policy? To what extend do epistemic communities play a role in the decision and 
process of proliferation? A clarification of the conditions and behavior in which these epistemic 
communities influence state preference to pursue nuclear weaponization would help complete 
existing models of epistemic community behavior, models which can be considered correct, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  World	  Statistics-­‐	  Nuclear	  Energy	  around	  the	  World.	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute.	  N.D,	  Web.	  Accessed	  30	  April	  2016.	  
3	  World	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  Stockpiles.	  Plowshare	  Fund.	  March	  2,	  2016.	  Web.	  Accessed	  30	  April	  2016.	  
4	  Nuclear	  Forces	  Reduced	  While	  Modernizations	  Continue.	  Stockholm	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute.	  16	  
June	  2014,	  Web.	  Accessed	  30	  April	  2016.	  
5	  Mai’a	  Cross	  “Rethinking	  Epistemic	  Communities	  Twenty	  Years	  Later”	  in	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies.	  British	  
International	  Studies	  Association,	  2013,	  Issue	  1.	  
6	  Emanuel	  Adler	  “The	  Emergence	  of	  Cooperation:	  National	  Epistemic	  Communities	  and	  the	  International	  Evolution	  
of	  the	  Idea	  of	  Arms	  Control”	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  International	  Organization.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  Winter	  1992,	  Issue	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  Politics	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incomplete. This study proposes 3 hypotheses regarding the proliferation effects of epistemic 
communities which can be enumerated as follows:  
 
H1: Epistemic communities acting as gate keepers significantly influence policy 
preferences of states through their analysis and recommendation of cost 
calculations, for both security and monetary dimensions 
H2: Epistemic communities are constrained in their ability to influence policy 
preferences of states to simply informing on pre-determined state preferences. 
H3: Epistemic communities can significantly influence policy preference but only 
under conditions of great uncertainty and in the absence of existing nuclear 
security guarantees. 
	  
 This study will employ the Epistemic Community Framework developed by Peter Haas, 
and first applied to nuclear security by Sara Zahra Kutchesfahani. The epistemic community 
framework is a neoliberal institutionalist model that puts particular emphasis on the relationships 
on the subnational and transnational level, for example between: epistemic communities and the 
behavior of states in international nuclear policy. This study will apply a historical case study 
methodology tracing the development of the nuclear weapons program of several states. 
Examining a plurality of states allows this study to examine not only the role of epistemic 
communities in weapons programs, but additionally illuminates indigenous factors within each 
case study’s state and time period that impact the epistemic-proliferation process. 
 The epistemic community framework will be applied in 4 historical case studies of 
nuclear proliferation. The selected proliferation cases are: The United States of America, The 
Union of Social Soviet Republics, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Republic of India. 
Grouped by era they represent proliferation events both prior to the development of an 
international nonproliferation regime (US and USSR nuclear programs predate the IAEA’s 





case studies are limited in scope, clearly other proliferation histories and even documented cases 
of attempted proliferation could be used. However this study aims only to describe historic 
behaviors and expand on existing theories, thus well documented cases where precise behaviors 
can be traced are preferable. Furthermore the pre-nuclear nonproliferation regime and post-
nuclear nonproliferation regime development division between the two case studies gives insight 
to the normative pressures that nonproliferation has leveraged on epistemic groups since the 
dawn of the nuclear age.  
Table 1  
Proliferation Case Studies Examined 






India 1974 Yes Non-signatory 
Pakistan 1998 Yes Non-signatory 
Soviet Union 1949 Yes Recognized Nuclear 
State 
The United States 1945 Yes Recognized Nuclear 
State 
 
One important area for clarification is the presence of a nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
The Nuclear Non-proliferation regime (NPR) is a broad decentralized network of 
intergovernmental organizations national/international nuclear security governance groups, 
private corporations, think-tanks, university research programs, multilateral/bilateral treaty 
arrangements and lobbyists. These diverse groups cooperate to generate, strengthen and practice, 
norms and policies for the control and reduction of nuclear weapons with varying degrees of 
support for civilian nuclear programs. Primary actors include the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the United Nations office for Disarmament Affairs, national governments and their 





export control regimes, bilateral treaty organizations and regional agreement bodies. The 
presence of this regime and the nonproliferation initiatives it supports determines the amount of 
resistance any decision to build nuclear weapons would face. Thus case studies were chosen to 
represent situations where the NPR was developed and operational and situations where it was 
still nascent. By examining epistemic action both with and without an NPR regime present, this 
study aims to describes ‘gaps’ in the recommendations and proliferation preferences in epistemic 
communities, regardless of the presence of established nonproliferation norm pressures.  
 This study will consist of 8 chapters. Aside from the introductory chapter each 
subsequent chapter will discuss different aspects, concepts and aforementioned historically 
grouped case studies. The second chapter will serve as a literature survey, examining and 
enumerating the existing literature’s explanations and perspectives. It will also clarify how this 
study fills in an important gap regarding modeling the behavior of epistemic communities. The 
third chapter will include a review of the concept of epistemic communities, and how the 
established literature describes their behavior. Once a clear definition of epistemic communities 
is crafted, one can begin placing them within a larger neoliberal model of: states the non-
proliferation regime and their interplay. The 4th chapter will include a holistic review of the non-
proliferation regime with special emphasis on how the non-proliferation regime defines 
proliferation and incentivizes that policy. This analysis provides the ‘backboard’ from which 
proliferation policy can be clearly defined. In short, this chapter strives to enumerate what 
standards states are ideally expected to comply with or against this set of expectations. In 
addition reviewing the non-proliferation regime in detail facilitates a necessary understanding of 





Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 will review the case studies of The United States, the USSR, 
Pakistan, and India. These cases were selected because they exhibit epistemic community action 
in regards to a proliferation event, both pre and post formation of the IAEA. Additionally, the 
case studies were chosen because the similarity in conditions. The United States and the USSR 
were competing hegemonic powers during their proliferation era, and underwent armament 
arguably before, if not during, the formation of non-proliferation norms. Pakistan and India 
represent non-aligned mid-range powers who armed under similar conditions (IAEA 
membership, both of whom would refuse to sign the NPT).  
Chapter 9 will enumerate and analyze my findings from the previously executed case 
studies. It will identify instances of epistemic communities encouraging/facilitating proliferation 
as a policy. Once instances are identified considerations on how the recommendations were 
received/acted upon will be used to judge the extent of influence exerted by the community 
itself.  In addition, concurrent factors will be considered that may have artificially distorted the 
influence exerted by the epistemic community in question. 
Finally, Chapter 10 will be the conclusion of the study, providing an overview of the 
study’s findings, areas for further research and broader reflections on the findings.  In addition 
the study will offer potential policy prescriptions to help mitigate the threat of proliferation 
through the epistemic related avenues traced in the research.  
This study aims to undertake a historical review of epistemic community influence on 
proliferation policy preferences. Due to the nature of nuclear proliferation decisions specifically 
national security confidentiality practices, this study is subject to numerous limitations. As a 





and examine the records of the various epistemic communities in question. This renders certain 
archival information on many epistemic community recommendations and actions unavailable. 
Furthermore access to foreign government records on how recommendations were received is 
incompletely available at best. Given the standing international agreements on nuclear non-
proliferation, any program or consideration by a government to ‘go nuclear’ would be strictly 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 The following is a survey of the major works of literature used in conducting the analysis 
of the study. The literature can be divided into two areas: elements of international relations 
theory and case-specific historical analysis material. The international relations theory literature 
used in this study is dominated by authors Peter Haas and Emanuel Adler. Much of the epistemic 
literature involved in this study comes from the winter 1992 issue of International Organization. 
The case-specific literature came from a variety of sources, some case studies were more 
developed in the literature than others. The Manhattan Project has left a rich record that spawned 
a profusion of literature. In contrast, the Pakistani nuclear program is less understood given its 
inherently incomplete record and more recent timeframe.  
 The application of epistemic community theory to security studies is an underdeveloped 
portion of the literature.7 Two articles by Emanuel Adler and Sara Zhara Kutchesfahani served as 
a model of the application of epistemic community theory into security studies subsectors.  
Emanuel Adler’s work outlined the influencing mechanics that epistemic communities had over 
the anti-ballistic missile treaty formation between the United States and the Soviet Union.8 Sara 
Zhara Kutchesfahani’s 2010 study expanded the application of epistemic community theory into 
the non-proliferation debate as practiced between Argentina and Brazil (two aspiring nuclear 
powers). The basic form and character of epistemic communities remains relatively unchanged 
in these works, though there is some variance in each author’s precise definition of what is an 
epistemic community. Epistemic community boundaries have been challenged in the literature, 
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  Emanuel	  Adler	  and	  Peter	  M.	  Has	  “Conclusion:	  Epistemic	  Communities,	  World	  Order,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  a	  
reflective	  research	  program”	  in	  International	  Organization	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992,	  Issue	  1,	  387.	  





with some authors accusing the existing definitions of being too narrow, an issue that will be 
discussed in chapter 3.9  
 The Manhattan Project oriented literature includes a wide array of perspectives and 
sources including personal correspondences, memoir style accounts of the Manhattan project,10 
and academic historical accounts of the project’s development. In particular American Scientists 
and Nuclear Weapons by Robert Gilpin provided extensive information on the ideological 
debates occurring among Los Alamos scientists working on the project.11 James Goodby in his 
work At the Border of Armageddon enumerates the political development of the American 
nuclear weapon infrastructure, including insight into the earliest precedents set by Roosevelt and 
Truman’s interplay with the nascent Manhattan Project.12 Information regarding the role of 
Secretary of War Stimson on the Manhattan Project came from Monkia Adamcyzk, author of 
Henry Stimson and His Influence on Harry Truman: A Victorian Conservative in the Atomic 
Court in which a survey of the impact of individual personality and leadership style on the 
Manhattan Project is undertaken in particular detail.13  
 Information on the Soviet nuclear weapons program was sourced from essentially three 
books, though Manhattan Project related sources tended to give some insight into the Soviet 
equivalent. David Holloway, author of two books on the Soviet nuclear weapons program 
provides an extensive enumeration of perspectives and information on the technical and political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Cross,	  154.	  
10	  Robert	  Jungk,	  Brighter	  than	  a	  Thousand	  Suns:	  A	  Personal	  History	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Scientists.	  New	  York:	  Harcourt	  
Brace,	  1958.	  
11	  Robert	  Gilpin	  American	  Scientists	  and	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Policy	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1962.	  
12	  James	  E.	  Goodby	  At	  the	  Borderline	  of	  Armageddon	  Oxford:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  2006.	  
13	  Monika	  Adamczyk	  “Chapter	  8:	  Henry	  Stimson	  and	  His	  Influence	  on	  Harry	  Truman:	  A	  Victorian	  Conservative	  in	  the	  
Atomic	  Court”	  in	  Jean	  Krasno	  and	  Sean	  Lapides,	  Eds.	  Personality,	  Political	  Leadership,	  and	  Decision	  Making	  Santa	  





influences on the Soviet atomic program.14 Complimenting these account are articles selected 
from The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khruschev edited by John Barber and 
Mark Harrison covering the role of scientific institutions in providing the personnel for the 
Soviet program.15 
 The Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs have less representation in the literature than 
their American and Soviet counterparts. Rizwana Abbasi author of Pakistan and the New 
Nuclear Taboo provides a foundational work for understanding the history of nuclear 
weaponization in Pakistan.16 Given the fragmented and often inaccessible nature of historic 
archives regarding these events, Abbasi’s work provides a comprehensive and modern analysis 
of the program’s technical history. Itty Abraham author of The Making of the Indian Atomic 
Bomb provides similar insight to the Indian PNE program and how the AEC developed in 
parallel under the leadership of individual chairmen.17 Regional analysis of the rivalry between 
India and Pakistan is provided by the work of Stephen Cohen and Richard L. Park.18 
 This study will contribute to existing literature by examining the events chronicled in 
each case study, with special emphasis on the political ramifications of epistemic community 
action. Examining these historical narratives allows this study to enumerate the behavior of 
epistemic communities and the reactions of their host governments within the specialized realm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  David	  Holloway,	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Arms	  Race.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  UP,	  1983,	  and	  David	  Holloway,	  Stalin	  and	  
the	  Bomb:	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Atomic	  Energy,	  1939-­‐1956.	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  UP,	  1994.	  
15	  John	  Barber	  and	  Mark	  Harrison	  eds.	  The	  Soviet	  Defence-­‐Industry	  Complex	  from	  Stalin	  to	  Krushchev	  New	  York:	  
Macmillan	  Press,	  2000.	  
16	  Abbasi,	  Rizwana	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  new	  nuclear	  taboo:	  regional	  deterrence	  and	  the	  international	  arms	  control	  
regime	  Peter	  Lang	  Publishing,	  2012.	  
17	  Itty	  Abraham	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Indian	  Atomic	  Bomb	  New	  York:	  Zed	  Books	  1998.	  





of nuclear weaponization events thus contributing to the application of epistemic community 





Chapter 3: Epistemic Community Theory 
 
Epistemic communities represent formal and informal networks of professionals who 
study or contribute to a certain subject area with policy relevant expertise. Epistemic 
communities exist in a wide variety of forms, covering virtually every professionally researched 
subject area. As authoritative sources for hyper-specialized knowledge, they often provide 
critical guidance and information for governments considering undertaking a given policy. 
Epistemic communities exist serving virtually every academic and scientific subject area.  
Existing theory postulates that certain properties endogenous to epistemic communities such as 
policy coherence, and the amount of respected quantitative data the epistemic community can 
back up its claims that all impact the persuasiveness of epistemic communities. Other factors 
exogenous to the community are also believed to play a role; the accessibility to decision makers, 
the nature of uncertainty in the situation (whether stemming from a perceived crisis or 
continuous political contention), and the subject issue area at a hand. However it is clear that 
within certain parameters, the recommendations and influence of select networks of 
professionals becomes more influential in developing state policy, while in others it wanes.19  
The literature regarding the precise mechanics of their role in policy development and 
their influence on state behavior exists as a relatively nascent subsector of international relations.  
Existing literature describes epistemic communities with some variance, but the original 
understanding (albeit one that will be challenged by this study) first developed by Peter Haas’ 
1992 International Organization’s article states:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy 
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic 
community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and 
backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, 
which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community 
members; (2) shared causal beliefs which are derived from their analysis of 
practices leading or contributing to a set of problems in their domain and which 
then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible 
policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity- that is 
intersubjective internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge 
in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is a set 
of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will 
be enhanced as a consequence.20 
 
 This study challenges assumptions (1) and (4), on the grounds that nuclear policy related 
epistemic communities do not ubiquitously practice nonproliferation norms. Certain factions 
within epistemic communities may hold a defection in policy preference regarding nuclear 
nonproliferation. This muted defection can be observed in how members of nuclear epistemic 
groups facilitate both directly and indirectly government efforts or considerations to start a 
weaponization program. As for the commonality of the policy enterprise, epistemic communities 
can ‘fracture’ into a number of policy branches, at times concurrent on certain issues but at other 
times diametrically opposed positions (such as pro-vertical proliferation position in contrast to an 
absolute disarmament position). 
From a theoretical perspective it may be more appropriate to consider epistemic 
communities as special keepers of knowledge or debaters augmented with specialized 
knowledge, but with less emphasis on their policy cohesion and humanitarian norm distribution 
within the group.  Within the realm of nuclear security policy, epistemic communities offer two 
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potential services. They may either facilitate or argue against nuclear proliferation policies. Their 
specialized credentials and organization does create a specialized debate arena in which these 
policies are discussed and evaluated by fellow community members. An understanding of 
nuclear weaponization and the related physics/engineering process gives these groups both the 
ability to understand the horrors of, and reject the creation of, nuclear weapons. However it is 
this exact same knowledge that allows nuclear epistemic communities to guide, facilitate and 
promote a potential nuclear weapons program.  
 One issue for the research of epistemic communities is separating the peculiarities of the 
subject area from the effects and behavior of the epistemic community arrangement. For 
example, environmental science related epistemic groups have been found to strongly influence 
state behavior in a case study of environmental policy formation amongst Mediterranean 
bordering states.21 Given the aforementioned ability of nuclear epistemic groups to facilitate both 
proliferation policy and nonproliferation policy, it is difficult to draw a parsimonious parallel for 
environmental epistemic groups. Authoritative knowledge of environmental science does not 
incentivize or facilitate a state’s pursuit of environmentally unfriendly policies. Authoritative 
knowledge of nuclear physics is required for the development of any indigenous nuclear 
program, thus the implications of nuclear knowledge can be used to justify/facilitate both 
proliferation and non-proliferation.  
 The theoretical concept of epistemic communities is not without criticism. This criticism 
has centered on certain aspects and assumptions that contend that epistemic communities are 
‘special political actors’ due to their behavior, effect or position. These criticisms can be 
enumerated as follows: the influence of epistemic communities is exaggerated and their 
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influence ability depends on access to decision makers like any other political group, Epistemic 
communities are not necessarily better at solving complex policy problems when compared to 
governments, members of epistemic communities are driven by self-interest rather than some 
special outlook, and that epistemic communities must engage in political activism akin to how 
other common political groups influence policy.22  Further research to clarify these points of 
contention is required. It is important to note that the concept of epistemic communities has only 
be researched in the past 20 years, and it is still very much embryonic in terms of clear cut 
definitions and parameters for epistemic behavior.  
 In terms of the future evolution of the literature surrounding epistemic communities 
several key elements can be identified as areas of the theory still under development or 
expansion. One such junction is the merging of global governance frameworks with epistemic 
community action. Setting international standards for issue areas such as industrial/commercial 
safety codes, motor vehicle and other issues of global scope, are considered areas for 
transnational global governance. The literature postulates that epistemic communities could play 
a considerable role through transnational governance channels.23  As one author succinctly 
described: “Epistemic communities are at the forefront of recognized trends towards 
transnational governance, and they are a major means by which knowledge translates into 
power.”24 This permeability of influence highlights their transnational roles. Their influences 
“are not only underpinning specific government policies but also shaping governance more 
broadly.”25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Cross,	  151-­‐152.	  
23	  Ibid,	  140.	  
24	  Ibid,	  139.	  	  





 The concept of epistemic communities as described in recent literature is still in flux. The 
theory has expanded from its original evolution of accredited professional groups who provide 
special technocratic advice to information hungry governments.  The research has disputed the 
insulation of these communities, they advise a wide variety of non-state groups. Even the 
significance of their accreditation is in question as to whether or not it provides specialized 
influence in the public sphere or whether they are simply engaging in political activism akin to 
any other interest or lobby group. What the literature has uncovered is that their influence is 
enhanced by certain conditions and eroded in others. A short enumeration of these conditions is 
available in table 2. Of all the factors, the uncertainty surrounding a given issue area has been 
highlighted since the inception of the epistemic community framework and continues to be a 
factor of particular importance in ongoing research.26 
 This study will contribute to the existing debate by examining the behavior of epistemic 
groups during proliferation events in order to understand the mechanics of influence behind an 
epistemic community’s engagement with the decision to build a nuclear weapon. This issue 
arena is particularly interesting through an epistemic community perspective because epistemic 
community members populate both a non-proliferation faction and a proliferation faction 
depending on their stance regarding a theoretical weaponization plan- despite their similar 
background and understanding of nuclear physics. As an environment in which to observe 
epistemic communities in, nuclear weaponization programs also offer unique conditions where 
according to the literature, epistemic communities ought to be at their most persuasive and 
prestigious. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





 Epistemic communities are of increasing importance in the era of global governance. The 
theory as well as the actual behavior has developed since its inception in the literature. Scholars 
struggle to enumerate the conditions, precise definition and mechanisms that epistemic 
communities exist with. One important thing to consider is that the reality of epistemic groups is 
still evolving. As the world continues through the 21st century the impact of globalization, the 
information revolution and the evolution of global governance mechanisms, the interpretation 






Recent Findings in Epistemic Literature 
Conditions linked to enhanced Epistemic 
persuasion: 
Authors 
When debate Conditions are… 
dealing with complex issues with inherent 
uncertainty from an external crisis 
Haas, Radaelli 
knowledge surrounding the issue is uncertain, 
and the issue is politically salient 
Radaelli 
When the political context includes… 
open or increased access to top level decision 
makers 
Haas, Drake, Nicolaidis 
Prior understanding of positions, behaviors 
and preferences of decision makers by 
epistemic community members 
Richardson 
When policy development levels are… 
nascent and still formulating established 
positions well before a decision is made 
Raustiala 
lacking in technical understanding and 
requiring epistemic insight in the technical 
rather than political debate 
Peterson and Bomberg 
When coalition and political alliances… 
are uncertain and divided in policy 
preference; lacking cohesive aims 
Peterson 
view epistemic community members as 
sharing a high level of professional reputation 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
When policy coherence in the sector… 
requires epistemic community members to 
present quantitative ‘hard’ data rather than 
subjective qualitative data 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
covers natural objective systems rather than 
subjective social structures. 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
epistemic perspectives (norms and policy 
recommendations) are compatible with 
existing institutional norms 
Jordan and Greenway, Sabatier 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Chapter 4: The Non-Proliferation Regime 
 
 The Non-proliferation regime encompasses a diverse array of actors, institutions, and 
established norms. While certain arrangements, namely the International Atomic Energy 
Association and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons represent the most 
inclusive global forms of non-proliferation controls, other elements such as bilateral agreements, 
nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs), multilateral export control regimes (MECRs) and 
intangible norms (regarding both nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear use) all impact the 
behavior of states and even non-state entities in considering or pursuing nuclear weapons. Any 
discussion regarding the extent to which epistemic communities influence proliferation decisions 
would be utterly incomplete without an enumeration and understanding of the nature of the 
nonproliferation regime (NPR). In short, the diversity of the NPR’s mechanics warrants review 
for two reasons. Firstly a review of the NPR lays the foundation for understanding the political 
arena in which potential proliferation occurs. Secondly, it offers an ideal narrative to place 
existing theoretical approaches and explanations regarding nuclear non-proliferation.  
 The genesis of the nonproliferation regime can be traced to World War II, and the United 
States’ use of nuclear weapons against Japan. Nuclear weapons and their unrivaled destructive 
capability were immediately recognized as having revolutionary implications for military force 
projection and geopolitics. Much of the Cold War’s strategy was designed entirely around 
nuclear capabilities in the form of conceptual practices such as mutually assured destruction 
(MAD), or extended deterrence (nuclear security guarantees).28 Realism offers particularly 
effective analysis of this behavior in the form of deterrence theory. This approach defines the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





requirements for maintaining deterrence against a rival state as the presence of credible 
capabilities, clearly communicated threat and a credible willingness to carry out said threat. The 
logic underlying deterrence theory is simple: that use of nuclear force begets a nuclear retaliation 
and thus both the aggressor and victim face extremely high costs for any nuclear deployment, 
rendering it unappealing to the material cost-benefit perspective practiced by a realist state. This 
logic however does not always mirror reality, the United States between 1945 and 1949 held a 
nuclear monopoly that went (thankfully) unexploited in terms of nuclear use, despite the threat of 
an expansionist untrustworthy (as yet non-nuclear) USSR. The nuclear monopoly era would 
according to realist logic, have allowed the U.S to deploy and use nuclear weapons without fear 
of equal retaliation. Indeed a close review of Operation Unthinkable, a joint strike plan by British 
and American forces against the USSR drawn up immediately following World War 2 included 
the infamous ‘dropshot plan’ which “envisaged that the US would attack Soviet Russia and drop 
at least 300 nuclear bombs…”29 Despite the lack of retaliation, some other mechanism not 
accounted for in realist logic intervened, preventing nuclear use against the USSR.  
The horrors of nuclear use left a deep impression on the global community, so much so 
that the first resolution out of the newly formed United Nations established a commission “to 
deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters…”30 
with an aim to abolish the existence of nuclear weapons. It immediately became clear that this 
highly destructive technology must be controlled lest the ‘great boon’ later hailed by Eisenhower 
fall into the wrong hands and become a great hazard. Thus a nonproliferation norm was quickly 
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appeared as practiced by states seeking to protect themselves from the effects of nuclear warfare. 
One particularly well suited approach for explaining the emergence and spread of this anti-
nuclear sentiment is constructivism. Constructivist scholars have produced a wealth of literature 
on the role and impact nonproliferation as a norm. While norms are diverse and asymmetrical in 
terms of content and impact, nonproliferation sentiment can be topically considered a regulative 
norm,31 designed to constrain the behavior of states away from nuclear pursuits. Nonproliferation 
norms underpin all of the following NPR mechanisms, with varying degrees of effectiveness in 
terms of its application. While constructivism provides laudable insight into the formation and 
even life cycle of nonproliferation as a widely held state preference, its explanatory ability is 
inherently limited to the status quo. That is to say constructivism in application to nuclear non-
proliferation behavior can effectively explain why and how states shun nuclear weaponization in 
the moment, but falls short of effectively describing what conditions and mechanics could cause 
a state to renege on its nonproliferation commitments or expectations. 
The IAEA was established as an autonomous agency within the United Nations in 1957. 
Although it was embedded in the United Nations, the IAEA is an entirely separate entity from 
the cluster of United Nations organizations. It does however report to the General Assembly and 
Security Council in certain matters. The primary function of the IAEA is to oversee an 
international civilian nuclear program inspection regime, though it falls short of being a 
regulatory body.32 The nature and scope of the inspection regime has undergone evolution since 
its first inception. States party to the agency can be divided into two groups: nuclear weapon 
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states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). For non-nuclear states IAEA membership 
represents a tradeoff of sovereignty rights (in this case their right to divert certain nuclear 
materials and weaponize) for security and technology resources (foreign aid for civilian nuclear 
programs). For nuclear states, membership represents a tradeoff of budgetary and disarmament in 
the form of foreign aid obligations in return for enhanced legitimacy and security. This balance 
between the privileges of NWS and the subsidization of NNWS is indicative of its attempts to 
maintain an atmosphere of inclusion with regards to member states within an inherently 
discriminatory arrangement of states.33  
The IAEA’s institutional independence from the United Nations gives it enhanced 
insulation from the political pressures of the UN G.A and S.C. The United Nations has its own 
department to handle nuclear disarmament affairs in the form of the United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The IAEA’s independence may have its roots to the events 
early on in United Nations history. During a session of the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission (UNAEC) where the Soviet Union rejected the Baruch plan, which envisioned UN 
oversight of nuclear material in much the same manner the IAEA operates today. The USSR 
rejected the Baruch plan on grounds that the UN was an American puppet organization. Though 
the original concept of International oversight of nuclear stockpiles was shelved, it was 
ultimately resurrected in 1957. The legal structure of the IAEA was carefully designed to 
maximize state ratification and flexibility. Article 3 of the Statute of the IAEA states that the 
IAEA and member-states will accept safeguard measures as agreed upon in negotiation and 
ratification. Legally speaking article III represents the consensual application of IAEA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





monitoring,34 a sovereignty bargain that is critical to the empowerment of any nuclear control 
regime. Compliance with article 3 is attained with the adoption of a Comprehensive Safeguard 
Agreement, or CSA. CSA’s are legal agreements where a state accepts the jurisdiction of IAEA 
safeguards on all nuclear material and activity within its borders.35 In the event of ‘non-
compliance’ the IAEA board of governors is to report the conditions and context of this non-
compliance to the U.N Security Council for further action.36 IAEA Safeguards are measures 
undertaken for “verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”37 and its non-diversion from 
civilian atomic energy programs. The IAEA in the past has been considered nothing more than 
nuclear accountants, especially after the covert proliferation events in India, Pakistan and North 
Korea. Safeguard practices prior to the adoption of the NPT were non-confrontational and 
routine, a deficiency that allowed the case histories in chapters 7 and 8 to occur.   
The treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons or NPT, went into force in 1970 
in order to remedy these institutional weaknesses. It was designed to advance 3 objectives, these 
were 1) the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, 2) the elimination of existing stockpiles 
held by nuclear weapon states, and 3) the promotion of civilian uses for nuclear technology. To 
this day the NPT is one of the most successful arms control treaties, only 4 states have never 
ratified (India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan) and 1 exited the treaty (North Korea).  
 The NPT was designed and ratified by the vast majority of nation-states. It was a globally 
produced document that was designed to advance a set of nuclear arms control policies. This 
global community of signatories represented a wide array of interests, which is reflected in the 
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articles and content of the NPT. In essence three main ‘blocs’ of states were party to the treaty’s 
negotiation, the American-Western Europe bloc, the Soviet bloc, and the non-aligned movement 
(NAM). Thus the treaty had to balance the needs of serious arms control and threat mitigation 
between the American/Western-Europe bloc and the Soviet bloc, all while fulfilling the needs 
and wants of the NAM states. Indeed it was a neutral country, Ireland that in 1958 began to 
officially call for an ad hoc UN committee to examine the threats posed by nuclear 
dissemination.38 This ‘Irish resolution’ set the foundation of a non-proliferation/inspection 
regime that would become the hallmarks of the NPR. The diplomatic negotiation process, which 
included a vast diversity of interests and approaches, resulted in a treaty that was flexible; the 
treaty respected the internal security of NWS- but leveraged disarmament obligations upon them. 
The treaty also subjected NNWS to an inspection regime on declared nuclear sites, but offered 
facilitation incentives for the development of peaceful nuclear programs. 
The NPR unto itself is not perfect- it is still possible to covertly make progress in 
producing a nuclear weapon program. In response the International community produced “the 
Additional protocol to the IAEA comprehensive Safeguard’s agreement”, or IAEA document 
INFCIR/540. The additional protocol, or AP, in addition to other expanded powers, gave the 
IAEA the right to perform surprise short-notice inspections on undeclared locations suspected of 
being used for illicit activities.  In 18 articles INFCIR/540 enumerates several other expanded 
powers in addition to surprise-short term inspection these include automatic visa renewals for 
inspectors, increased access to information regarding nuclear sites, and greater ability to use 
information gathered by outside sources in determining search parameters.39 The AP was signed 
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and ratified by 133 of the 147 members of the IAEA’s board of governors, and the lack of its 
universal ratification is commonly identified as a security issue by literature judging the 
effectiveness of the AP in nuclear security.40 Regardless, these widely adopted expansions of 
power for the IAEA were only made possible under the framework established by the NPT, 
which had empowered the inspection regime with a jurisdiction in the first place. The ability of 
the NPT to self-amend loopholes or perceived issues in its treaty progress is part of what makes 
it such a resilient treaty. Member-states can react to new information (the revelation of Iraq’s 
covert program, the 1998 Pakistani nuclear tests etc) by manipulating the treaty’s scope and 
character as seen in the adoption of the expanded rights of INFCIR/540. 
The IAEA and the UN are two multilateral organizations concerned with nuclear security 
in the International community. There are however other regional, bilateral and non-
governmental organizations dedicated to checking the spread of nuclear weapons. These 
organizations may not have the geographical scope or sweeping powers of the IAEA or the 
United Nations, but nonetheless form important conduits for non-proliferation norms to be 
espoused and observed. 
Multi-lateral export control regimes (MECRs) are sets of informal agreements established 
among groups of states with the aim to control the international market of commodities that do 
pose a weaponization threats. Table 3 enumerates the details of each regime. These are relatively 
low obligation IGOs, and do not have the formal legal character or institutional independence to 
undertake actions alone. They are better understood as round-table discussion on agreed upon 
best practices for specific issue areas. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Multilateral Export Control Regimes 







NSG 1975 45 Generates guidelines in governing 
exports of nuclear material, 
technologies and related equipment. 
Includes two classifications; 




AG 1984 39 NSG equivalency, but focuses on 
biological and chemical technologies 




MTCR 1987 34 Establishes export controls on missile 
technology of a certain size and the 
related avionic technology and 
required fuel propellants to produce 
long range missiles. 
The Wassenaar 
Arrangement 
WA 1995 39 Replaced a Cold War era conventional 
weapon control mechanism known as 
COCOM. Regulates the sale of 
conventional weapons to agreed upon 
states and even non-state actors. 
 
These export control regimes are markedly informal, their observance is entirely a matter 
of national discretion, and these organizations contain no authority to exercise any punitive 
power. They are merely annual meetings and lists of expected behavior. Regardless, they 
demonstrate a willingness of states to communicate their desire to work towards tighter controls 
on weaponization technologies. Another political arrangement that has similar features (lack of 
punitive mechanisms coupled to normative posturing) is Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs). 
NWFZs were created by a number of states both regionally and independently to internationally 
establish their renunciation of nuclear ambitions, a sort of confidence building measure. There 
are 7 NWFZs, and  
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2 Nuclear weapon free geographical regions. These agreements are more normative than they are 
legislative, however this does not detract from their influencing potential. These agreements are 
enumerated in name, region and year established in Table 4. 
 Bilateral arms control treaties such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT), the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
also play an important part of advancing the cause of the NPR. Both parties to SALT and 
START talks are also IAEA/NPT members, the reason for their external negotiations on matter 
of disarmament is clear; Within a multilateral asymmetrical organization such as the IAEA 
pressure from NNWS to disarm would complicate and restrict the negotiation behavior of NWS. 
However, if negotiations for disarmament are done in private (bilaterally as opposed to 
multilaterally) much less pressure is leveraged against NWS, as only two perspectives (those of 
competing NWS) are on the table. 
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Table	  442 
Nuclear Weapon Free zones and Regions 
Name Year Region Covered 
Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967 Latin American and Carribean 
Treaty of Rarotonga 1985 South-East Asia/Oceania 
Treaty of Pelindaba  1996 Africa 
Treaty of Bangkok 1995 South East Asia 
Mongolia’s Nuclear 
Weapon Free Status 
1992 Mongolia  
Central Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone 
2006 Central Asia 
Antarctic Treaty 1959 Antarctica 
Sea-bed Treaty 1971 Global sea-bed 





 International agreements and pronunciations play an important role in setting the 
precedents, taboos and best practices of nuclear security. The NPR is not solely comprised of 
state level instruments and arrangements however. A critical part of the NPR are a global 
community of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These organizations allow private 
interests and citizens to apply pressure to governments on matters relating to nuclear security. 
This ecosystem of NGOs is complex though several important initiatives such as the Pugwash 
Conferences (an NGO that brings prominent scholars and public figures to work towards conflict 
reduction and non-proliferation), the plowshares movement (an anti-nuclear Christian lobby), 
and the ‘Federation of American Scientists’ (a non-proliferation lobby of American scientist) are 
quick to come to mind. These organizations, though small in authority when compared to their 
IGO counterparts, play an important role in spreading a culture of non-proliferation throughout 
the world. Epistemic communities would topically be considered informal networks operating in 
parallel to NGOs on the subnational, national and transnational levels. Epistemic community 
members often work for NGOs to espouse their policy aims, such as the Federation of American 
Scientists mentioned prior. 
 The NPR is a complex regime, designed around a matrix of organizations and 
communities pursuing non-proliferation, or at the very least nuclear control objectives. In terms 
of legal character the NPR takes many manifestations but draws authority from ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
law simultaneously. The NPR’s presence in the United Nations community, coupled with its 
ability to address the GA and UNSC give it great punitive potential but export the responsibility 
of gauging and reacting to non-compliance amongst member states to the global authorities in 






Chapter 5: The United States: The Opening of a Nuclear Pandora’s Box 
 
 
 The Second World War is an unparalleled event that shaped the political, social, 
technological and economic landscape of our time. The collusion of extreme wartime 
uncertainty, advancements in physics research and the doctrine of total war bred the conditions 
for the first round of nuclear proliferation. The political process behind the marrying of physics 
research and weaponization programs resulted in the well-known Manhattan Project. The 
Manhattan Project was a top-secret U.S government program, instituted by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (FDR) to weaponize Uranium 235 into a fission-based detonation device. An 
international epistemic community of physicists and academics were responsible for informing 
and facilitating the U.S decision to pursue nuclear weaponization.  
 As a case study, the United State’ initial episode of proliferation exists with certain 
peculiarities.  As a historic first, the decision by the epistemic community to push for 
weaponization was done in a ‘norm-vacuum.’ There were voices of non-proliferation among the 
epistemic communities concerned with nuclear physics who were opposed to further 
weaponization even before any practical examples of its destructive power were available. This 
‘norm-vacuum’ essentially reduced the coherency and persuasiveness of the non-proliferation 
perspective at this time through a lack of certainty (ironically) towards the destructiveness of 
nuclear weapons.  
 In these conditions, the nascent ‘first move’ of nuclear proliferation occurred, at the 
behest of an informal epistemic community populated by top Western nuclear physicists. The 
Einstein-Szilard letter, drafted by Leo Szilard but signed by Albert Einstein and sent to 





fruition. The epistemic community that the letter represented would become intertwined heavily 
within government structures, engaging and contributing in the formulation of nuclear protocols. 
In the post-war years the collusion of epistemic community expertise alongside traditional legal 
and military perspectives was at its height, as one author explains: 
 … Although governments have depended heavily upon advice and assistance 
from scientists in times of crisis, the extent of the present-day [1962] political 
activities of scientists suggests something of a revolution in the relationship of the 
scientist to politics. Never before has the participation of scientists in the 
determination of public policy been as pervasive or as important… it was a group 
of scientists which suggested to the United States that it undertake the 
development of the atomic bomb. The success of the resultant Manhattan District 
Project in creating that bomb ushered in a new era in history- the age of the 
atom.43  
 
The post-war activities of many American nuclear epistemic community members such 
as Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller, and former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson would 
leave a lasting impact on American nuclear policy.  Stimson can be a considered a fringe element 
of the American nuclear epistemic community when one considers his fluency in nuclear issues 
in contrast to his legal background. The policy recommendations of the epistemic community as 
enumerated in project reports, committee recommendations and private correspondences from 
the period are evidence of the conflicting perspectives regarding the prudence of different 
aspects of nuclear policy. The epistemic community produced a wide array of policy 
recommendations that ran the gambit from absolute disarmament to embracing a nuclear arms 
race to its most destructive capacity in order to provide deterrence against a Soviet strike. 
This chapter aims to trace these events and provide instances of epistemic community 
members facilitating the proliferation process.  The history of the United States and the epistemic 
community involved in the formulation of its guiding nuclear principles is subject to certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





exogenous factors such as the absence of international control or even opinion on nuclear 
weapons. The United States experience with proliferation is unique; it was the first state to 
weaponize and did so in a global environment free of non-proliferation norms. This norm 
absence may partially explain why American epistemic communities in the 1940s, ‘50s and ‘60s 
participated and facilitated nuclear proliferation. But this does not detract from the theoretical 
value of the observations in the sense that they shed light on the dynamics of an epistemic 
community’s relationship to a weaponization program and relevant policy formulation. It 
additionally exposes the presence of contradictory policy prescriptions and fractures in the 
consensus of underlying assumptions amongst members of epistemic communities in their given 
issue area.  
An appropriate starting ‘touchpoint’ between the nuclear epistemic community at hand 
and the United States government is the aforementioned Einstein-Szilard Letter. The conditions 
and effects of the letter are in line with existing theory on epistemic community; the letter was 
advising a top decision maker (FDR), on a topic where existing government 
competency/understanding was extremely low: The feasibility of nuclear fission explosive 
devices. This letter gave the certification and professionalism of this epistemic community in the 
form of Dr. Einstein as a premium in terms of his ability to influence. It is important to note that 
this letter was sent on August 2, 1945, shortly after the annexation of Czechoslovakia, the 
Anschluss and the signing of the pact of steel between Italy and Germany. This was a time when 
Nazi Germany’s rise seemed unstoppable, starting a highly uncertain period where the future of 
world security seemed in jeopardy of devolving into another round of the ghastly slaughter that 
was World War 1. Imagine then, the persuasive effect of receiving a letter from the world’s pre-





and furthermore that this new weapon system was already being investigated by German 
scientists.  The letter was sent at an opportune time to say the least and stated:  
This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is 
conceivable- though much less certain – that extremely powerful bombs of a new 
type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and 
exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of 
the surrounding territory.44  
 
Nuclear weaponization was being offered as a solution to the overwhelming military 
needs at hand. The letter did not enumerate the human cost, the global threat, the Reductio ad 
absurdum of mutually assured destruction that the future of nuclear proliferation had in store. 
This initial communication set the stage for future state support of nuclear weapon programs, the 
chances of a non-proliferation or non-use decision were substantially lower as the terms, costs, 
and implications of entering the atomic age were not fully realized at the time. In essence the 
Einstein/Szilard letter is the opening of a Pandora’s Box to the nuclear age.  
 As the gravity and scope of nuclear weapons became increasingly clear, the government 
used the American nuclear epistemic community’s scientific perspectives and understandings to 
guide policy formation on the matter. The Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) was established in June of 1941 to oversee this integration.  The office was headed by 
Vannevar Bush who was an American scientist and engineer and would go on to deeply impact 
the nature of nuclear politics through his recommendations and oversight. It was in this capacity 
that Winston Churchill approached Vannevar Bush and Secretary of War Stimson to discuss the 
prospects of American-British collaboration on nuclear technology.45  This meeting lay the 
foundation for the August 19, 1943 “Article of Agreement Governing Collaboration between the 
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Authorities of the U.S.A and the U.K in the Matter of Tube Alloys” or the Quebec Agreement as 
it is commonly referred to.  The term “Tube Alloys” was used instead of disclosing the nuclear 
collaboration intent of the agreement.  This agreement pooled British and American resources 
with conditions of non-disclosure to complete the Manhattan Project as soon as possible  
The Quebec agreement was essentially a nuclear proliferation agreement, where both 
parties involved in the joint research and development of the Manhattan Project promised to: 
never use this technology against one another, never use it against another party without mutual 
agreement, never share nuclear technology except with mutual agreement, and a promise to 
revisit the costs and benefits of the nuclear weapons development program at the end of the war. 
This agreement included a sub-clause that embedded several British scientists in the United 
States to facilitate the exchange of ideas and approaches. Although British-American cooperation 
predates the Quebec agreement in the form of the MAUD committee’s July 1941 report to the 
U.S on the feasibility of weaponization,46 the Quebec agreement none the less set the stage for a 
nuclear monopoly shared between the United States and the United Kingdom, and even the 
asymmetrical rights that underpin the nuclear regime that exists today. 
The agreements and correspondence discussed until now have traced the development of 
the American-British war-time cooperation regime as encouraged by epistemic community 
members such as Albert Einstein, Edward Teller and Leo Szilard, the latter two of which would 
go on to work on the Manhattan Project directly and champion two opposing schools of thought 
in regards to nuclear policy.  British-American cooperation set certain parameters for which the 
epistemic community involved in nuclear research would operate in. Namely this cooperation 
opened the door for early horizontal proliferation between the United States and Great Britain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The non-disclosure aspects of the Quebec Agreement also enraptured the entire enterprise in a 
cloak of military secrecy, and by proxy military and government management styles. The 
Quebec agreement was endorsed by epistemic community members in the OSRD, whether or not 
it would have occurred without epistemic community influence on technology sharing is 
tangential to this study. However the transnational government-facilitated policy diffusion 
represented by the Quebec agreement allowed the pooling of resources and talent on an 
international scale. In contrast the Germany nuclear epistemic community was partially vacated 
by the iniquitous racial policy of Nazi Germany, causing many talented Jewish and Slavic 
scientists to flee Europe for the United States and Great Britain.  
The culture bred by the conditions and personnel of the Manhattan Project is far removed 
from the university halls and academic conferences that scientists are frequently associated with. 
Safely based away from the war, in Oak Ridge Tennessee and in conditions that allowed 
scientists to freely discuss ideas, no other nuclear community at the time, Russian or German, 
was as active in policy debates. The Manhattan Project was essentially a massive physics 
experiment culminating with the Trinity Nuclear test at Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16th, 
1945. While certain elements of the experimental design were originally conceptualized within 
the civilian research sphere by pre-war academics, the discussion on the experiment’s outcome 
and its application were discussed in political committees and government channels. 
The Interim Committee was established headed by Secretary of War Stimson “in order to 
provide an advisory role to the president about the use of atomic weapons.”47 The interim 
committee was the primary formal conduit through which epistemic community opinions would 
be proposed to high-level decision makers within the United States Government. Nuclear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi and Ernest Lawrence were attached to the 
Interim Committee as scientific advisors. The Interim Committee was the arena in which 
Secretary of War Stimson would debate the future of potential nuclear weapons use. As such it is 
appropriate that the committee be comprised of statesmen, military officials and scientists to 
properly gauge the decision though the true diversity of the committee’s membership in terms of 
background and education is still a matter of scholarly debate.48 A quick enumeration of its 
members in table 5 reveals the hybrid nature of the committee’s professional backgrounds which 
included academics, statesmen, and businessmen.  
Table	  549	  
Interim Committee 
Name Position Profession 
Henry L. Stimson Chairman Secretary of War, Lawyer 
George Harrison Member Assistant to Secretary of War, Businessman 
James Brynes Member Secretary of State, career politician  
Ralph Bard Member Undersecretary of the Navy, Businessman 
William Clayton Member Assistant Secretary of State, Businessman 
Vannevar Bush Member Director of OSRD, President of Carnegie 
Institute  
Karl T. Compton Member Chief of Field Service at OSRD, President 
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
James B. Conant Member Chairman of National Defense Research 
Committee, President of Harvard University 
 
 The 8-man committee would ultimately deliver a recommendation on June 1 1945, 
proposing that the bomb “Should be dropped as soon as possible… [on] a military installation or 
war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage… 
without prior warning.”50 Interestingly enough despite the presence of scientific and 
governmental perspectives who were aware of (but were still a month away from witnessing) the 
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destructive scope of atomic weaponry, only Ralph Bard a former businessman turned 
undersecretary of the Navy, expressed his dissent with the no prior warning recommendation.51   
During the lifespan of the Manhattan Project and the Interim Committee, the option of nuclear 
non-use was hardly addressed directly- more often it was simply assumed by the staff at hand 
that the nuclear bomb being produced would be used but with some disagreement on what targets 
were appropriate.52 The only elements up for debate were the target that would be coupled to this 
assumed nuclear strike.  
 The decision to use atomic weapons at the close of World War 2 is a well addressed 
subject in existing literature. One popular explanation highlights the cost of American lives 
versus the number of Japanese casualties in the twin nuclear strikes as the vindicating calculus 
behind the deployment of Little Boy and Fat Man.53 Another perspective emphasizes the desire 
of the United States to demonstrate to an increasingly distant U.S.S.R its nuclear capability as a 
check on the gargantuan amounts of conventional military strength the Red Army had which was 
in excess of 300 divisions at the time54.  These conceptual arguments are somewhat peripheral to 
the debate at hand. The decision to use nuclear weapons was made for a plurality of reasons and 
supported by a plurality of perspectives.  Central to this study is the set of perspectives came 
from epistemic community members, often within formal government capacities. The 
perspectives propagated were far from the ‘common policy enterprise’ existing epistemic 
literature espouses epistemic communities with.  Quite the contrary the epistemic community 
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involved in the American nuclear program displayed wide variance in which policies best suited 
American and global nuclear interests at the close of the 2nd World War.  
 The Interim Committee was designed to oversee the Manhattan Project and essentially 
form policy suggestions based on the status of the project. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 
acting as the committee’s chairman, is a decision-maker of particular importance when tracing 
the development of nuclear policy. Accounts of Cold War history argue “No man did more to set 
the stage for discussion within government on this subject than Henry L. Stimson who, as 
Secretary of War had supervised the Manhattan Project from the beginning.”55 Stimson was able 
to leverage great influence as Secretary of War, however influencing Stimson were the other 
members of the committee, the members of the scientific advisory board which included 
personnel such as Robert Oppenheimer who had an active first hand in the research and 
development of the new weapon system. 
 Robert Oppenheimer perhaps more so than any other scientist, represents the idealized 
epistemic community member. As an American born physicist working on the Manhattan 
Project, Robert Oppenheimer was an active member of the team that would carry out the 
conceptualization development and creation of the atomic bomb. At first he worked with great 
zeal towards the program’s objectives, specifically “Oppenheimer’s focus on technical success 
bred the assumption that the bomb would be utilized as a weapon without great consideration of 
the moral dimension of utilizing such a weapon.”56 Perhaps it was the lack of illumination on the 
full revolutionary scope of nuclear weaponization, but Oppenheimer’s initial eagerness in the 
Manhattan Project was quickly transcended by a growing concern for the implications of the 
project’s endgame. This doubt would culminate during the Trinity test, in a legendary episode of 
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nuclear history, where Oppenheimer witnessing the cloud of the trinity test is reminded of a 
verse of Hindu Scripture from the Bhagavad-Gita “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” 
Oppenheimer firmly opposed further proliferation, including the development of the hydrogen 
bomb- his laudable efforts at preventing further development and enhancement of existing 
atomic technology  put him at odds with his professional colleagues most notably Edward Teller, 
who would mount attacks on the character of Oppenheimer during the latter’s security clearance 
trial in 1954.57  
Oppenheimer’s change of heart is but one example of a growing set of epistemic 
responses to the potential horrors unleashed by nuclear technology post-trinity. Late into World 
War 2 where the tide of battle had turned decisively in favor of the allies the anti-nuclear 
character of the modern NPR began to ferment. Correspondences such as the Bohr memorandum 
and the Franck Report, both were sent in 1944 to President Roosevelt urging the creation of 
international control nuclear control mechanisms. Within the memorandum “Bohr specifically 
warned the President that any temporary advantage which the United States would gain through 
possession of the atomic weapon would be outweighed by a perpetual menace to human 
society.”58 An apt observation that has proven true, in an absolute sense the development of 
nuclear weapons has brought about a permanent change to humanity’s nature. Once discovered 
the weaponization potential of radioactive elements (along with their productive civilian uses) 
cannot be undiscovered, the potential threat can only be mitigated but never truly eliminated. 
Another fascinating aspect of Bohr’s memorandum was the inclusion of the recommendation that 
Stalin be informed of the Manhattan Project. If scientific research was completely transparent, 
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states would face considerably less uncertainty and the security dilemma underlying a nuclear 
arms race could be alleviated.  
 Despite non-use recommendations from some elements of the epistemic community, the 
Truman administration went forward with deployment of Fat Man and Little Boy. The August 6th 
and 9th 1945 nuclear strikes against Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively are the only two uses 
of nuclear weapons in warfare. The implications of these events irrevocably changed the nature 
of world politics. The nuclear scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project were in a unique 
position to provide policy suggestions and insight on these events.  At this point the epistemic 
community in the United States began an important division in recommended approach forward.  
The Baruch Plan was a proposal that mirrored the early sentiments of the epistemic 
community surrounding nuclear weapons and enjoyed popular support from scientists attached to 
the Manhattan Project.59 The plan essentially outlined IAEA style controls on civilian nuclear 
enterprises coupled with absolute elimination of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons 
programs. The proposal was submitted to the newly formed United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission (UNAEC) in June of 1946. It would ultimately be defeated by Soviet rejection, and 
at that moment the optimistic designs of the nuclear epistemic community would begin fracture 
against the hardline political realities of the emerging cold war arms race. Although the Baruch 
plan would be permanently shelved, the attempt by epistemic community members represents an 
important attempt at policy selection and policy diffusion mechanics. As a sub-national 
epistemic community, the scientists surrounding the Manhattan Project attempted to ‘graft’ a 
political arrangement into standing international practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan coupled with the U.S decision to pursue 
Hydrogen bomb technology caused a schism in the ‘common policy enterprise’ of the American 
epistemic community.60 The 3 schools of thought that emerged following the 1949 decision to 
pursue a hydrogen bomb by the Truman administration, these were: 1) the Control School, who 
recommended complete disarmament coupled with international controls over civilian use, 2) the 
Finite Containment School recommended continuing nuclear weapon research while 
implementing international controls over civilian use, and 3) the Infinite Containment School 
enumerated by Edward Teller, which believed an arms race was unavoidable until political 
cooperation between the U.S and the U.S.S.R became a tenable possibility. The Infinite 
Containment School essentially argued that the deterrence capability of nuclear weapons was the 
only realistic way to prevent a Soviet strike, thus the only way to win a nuclear confrontation is 
through having bigger and better stockpiles. 
 The epistemic community responsible for facilitating the development of nuclear 
weapons was catapulted to international importance following the 1945 nuclear strikes and the 
global debate it sparked. The effects of nuclear warfare had been witnessed by the world and the 
normative development of non-proliferation preferences were beginning to germinate 
internationally through the newly formed United Nations and domestically within the United 
States through Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Non-governmental organizations such as the 
Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and The National 
Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy also became politically active conduits for nuclear 
epistemic communities to espouse their call for caution and restraint in regards to nuclear war. 
These organizations and the voices of restraint they included, were decided civilian in character. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Scientists who refused to cooperate on the thermonuclear project often lost key government 
appointments and were forced out of decision-making on a governmental level.61 
 The development of the non-proliferation movement in the post-war years occurred in 
parallel to proliferation oriented weapons programs both within the United States and abroad.  
American scientist and AEC commissioner Lewis Strauss recommended investigation into fusion 
based atomic weaponry known as thermonuclear bombs or Hydrogen bombs, a sentiment that 
was echoed by his colleague and former Manhattan Project member Edward Teller.62 This was 
justified by epistemic community members through the Control School’s theoretical set of 
assumptions on the desirability of nuclear deterrence. However the deterrence-effect justification 
was rejected by some of Teller’s colleagues such as Robert Oppenheimer who did not share the 
same causal assumptions surrounding the deterrence capability of nuclear weapons.  
Thus while one branch of the American epistemic community began to pursue a policy of 
absolute disarmament and non-proliferation, another would pursue limited proliferation, both 
horizontal (sharing nuclear technology with British contacts as enumerated in the Quebec 
Agreement) and vertical, in the form of the Control School’s endorsement of nuclear weapons 
and later thermonuclear weapons as deterrents.  Despite their common membership in the 
nuclear epistemic community, American epistemic community members came to vastly different 
conclusions regarding the best course of action to take in terms of nuclear policy by the United 
States. This variance can be traced to their causal understandings on the effects of nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent, the appropriateness of nuclear devices as a tactical weapon, and the 
implications of liberalizing access to technical nuclear knowledge. 
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Chapter 6: The USSR: The Centralization of Nuclear Policy 
 
 The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was the second state in history to attain nuclear 
status on 29th of August 1949 with the detonation of RDS-1, a plutonium fueled fission nuclear 
explosive.63 The Soviet Union’s path to nuclear weaponization was markedly different from the 
U.S experience (though in a twist of irony the RDS-1 plutonium device was a copy of American 
blueprints). The origins of both programs begin with realizations within epistemic communities 
of the vast weaponization potential that nuclear fission promised and attempts to alert national 
authorities to the threat.  
 The Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet socialist ideology held scientific research and 
development in high regard, Vladimir Lenin was aware of the importance of research and 
development in fueling economic growth and military strength and incorporated these concepts 
into party slogans.64 Despite the rhetorical support for scientific pursuits, the scientific and 
academic community of Russia remained critically under-funded and lagged behind western 
standards well into World War 2.65 This disparity was due to a number of factors but certainly 
not due to a lack of talent or eagerness on behalf of the Russian scientific community; one 
Russian physicist who had the opportunity to work in Cambridge University wrote home “To 
return to Petrograd and torment myself with the absence of gas, electricity, water and apparatus 
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is simply impossible. It is only now that I have felt my strength. Success gives me wings and I 
am carried along by my work.”66 
 In the decades prior to World War 2, a number of critical interrelated discoveries were 
made regarding the feasibility of inducing a nuclear chain reaction using radioactive elements. 
These discoveries were made largely in the research laboratories of Western European and 
American universities.67 As news of these discoveries and copies of these scientific articles 
reached Russia, the domestic scientific community began to reflect on the implications of these 
discoveries. One such article published in the journal Nature on February 18, 1939, was 
“Physical Evidence for the Division of Heavy Nuclei under Neutron Bombardment” and was the 
first report to confirm the fission of Uranium atoms into barium when subject to neutron 
bombardment.68 
	  The article motivated a number of scientists to alert the governments of Germany, Great 
Britain and the United States of the potential military implications and desirability of further 
research in 1939. The first attempt at alerting the Soviet Government was by Nikolay Semyonov 
in late 1940 who wrote to the government describing a bomb of devastating potential, though it 
elicited no response.69 In May of 1942, Georgy Flyorov, a Russian born physicist who along with 
his colleagues Igor Kurchatov and Andrei Sakharov would be the central scientists of the Soviet 
weapons program, sent a letter to Stalin detailing the recent discoveries in physics. In the letter 
Flyorov explained that over the last two years Western journals had stopped publishing on the 
topic of fission, leading him to believe that not only was weaponization of Uranium feasible- but 
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that the ‘Western capitalist’ countries had already seen fit to begin secret research and 
development programs. Flyorov essentially proposed a meeting of top Russian physicists to 
discuss the technical challenges to building a fission based Uranium bomb as soon as possible. 
The meeting Flyorov requested was never granted, but when the Soviet weapons program did 
begin to take root in 1943, many of the scientists mentioned in the letter, including Flyorov 
himself were brought aboard.   
Georgy Flyorov’s logical deduction, that the disappearance of fission related articles from 
Western science publications after 1939 implied the creation of top secret research and 
development projects in western states, is of particular importance to this study. Flyorov’s 
membership in the physics epistemic community and his awareness of the state of the science, 
allowed him to realize his colleagues abroad had begun practicing a policy of censorship. 
Cognizant of the weaponization potential of fission based explosive devices, it was clear to 
Flyorov that the scientific research had continued, but was likely classified by individual states. 
Part of what Flyorov had perceived in publication patterns, was actually the work of Leo Szilard, 
future Manhattan Project physicist, campaigning in the Western world to halt further academic 
publications on the nature of fission given its weaponization potential.70 This academic 
censorship campaign by Szilard and Flyorov’s detection, is a tacit albeit unconventional example 
of policy diffusion mechanics in epistemic communities, while his letter to Stalin can be 
interpreted as an attempt at policy selection based on this diffusion.  
In September 1941, an NKVD agent in London was able to transmit elements of the 
British MAUD report back to Moscow.71 It was not until March 10, 1942, that People’s 
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Commissar for Internal Affairs (or NKVD), L.P Beriia presented the intercepted intelligence 
from the British MAUD committee to the Soviet State Defense Committee (also known as the 
GKO).72 Lavrentiy Pavolovich Beria was a Commissar for Internal Affairs, the infamous Soviet 
secret police force. Somewhat surprisingly the NKVD was heavily involved in the Soviet 
weaponization program. In the Soviet system the NKVD was suited for the task of weapons 
development as one author describes  
It is understandable if Beria, as People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs was 
designated chief administrator of the ‘Uranium Project’ Within Beria’s sphere of 
authority were deployed thousands of convict laborers, dozens of industrial 
enterprises of varied assortment, several military industrial research institutes and 
design bureaux [sic] and so on.73  
 
In the centralized Soviet style of government, the Red Army exercised little authority in 
research and development matters, this may be rooted in early Soviet distrust of the Red Army 
and its willingness to purge the institution while expropriating its functions (such as military 
R&D) to other executive organs, such as the comparatively trustworthy and well-equipped secret 
police.74  
 The first heartbeat of the official Soviet weapons program came on the 27th of November 
1942 when the GKO adopted a resolution ‘On the mining of Uranium’ which outlined 
parameters to begin producing Uranium stockpiles at higher rates. By 1943, the Soviet 
government had created secret laboratories within the USSR academy of Sciences, with Igor 
Kurchatov, a contemporary of Georgy Flyorov and Andrei Sakharov, as its chief.75 Progress 
proved slow for the Soviet weapons program largely due to material constraints and insufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Simonov,	  151.	  
73	  Simonov,	  155.	  
74	  Ibid,	  156.	  





access to Uranium. The American strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki reinvigorated Soviet 
efforts to weaponize in order to counter an American nuclear monopoly. Resolution 9887 of the 
GKO, adopted on the 20th of August 1945 created a special committee to oversee the Uranium 
project.76  
 The final decision and production of a Soviet nuclear device was heavily influenced by 
the impact of American proliferation events, as the existing literature notes “The Soviet atomic 
bomb test of August 1949 helped to speed up American work on thermonuclear weapons 
[Hydrogen bombs], and American policy in turn stimulated Soviet weapons research and 
development.”77 Foreshadowing the emphasis on maintaining at the least, nuclear parity with the 
United States, competition with the US became a policy objective of Soviet leadership well into 
the Cold War.  
A Soviet hydrogen bomb was produced and tested in November of 1955 although a crude 
hydrogen bomb variant, several magnitudes weaker than the ‘superbomb’ class of two stage 
fission-fusion devices.78  During a celebration banquet for lead scientists and military officers 
following the November 1955 ‘true’ hydrogen bomb test, a conversation between Andrei 
Sakharov and future Deputy Minister of Defense for Armament Mitrofan Nedelin encapsulated 
the future of nuclear weapons policy in the Soviet system. The exchange occurred after Sakharov 
delivered a toast celebrating the successful test, when one author chronicles that Nedelin shared 
an anecdote with Sakharov:  
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An old man wearing only a shirt is praying before an icon with a light in front of 
it. ‘Guide me and make me strong, guide me and make me strong [sic].’ The old 
woman is lying on the stove and says from there ‘You just pray for strength old 
man, I can guide it in myself’ Let’s drink to growing strong.’ Sakharov found the 
story ominous ‘I made no reply, but I was shaken inside. To some extent one can 
say… that this was one of the stimuli that made a dissident out of me.’ The point 
of the story was clear. The scientists, engineers, and workers had created a terrible 
weapon, but would have no say in how it was used.79 
 
 The Soviet system of government relied heavily on centralization of party 
doctrine and the quashing of internal dissent. Nuclear policy in the Soviet Union was no 
different, and scientific perspectives on nuclear use were rarely solicited or offered in the 
immediate post war years. What little discussion there was of Soviet strategic defense 
policy was often argued through the theories and axioms of Soviet paragons such as 
Vladimir Lenin. The death of Stalin in 1953 and the end of ‘Stalinist Military Science’ 
helped open the field to some degree of debate and critique. Prior Stalin’s positions 
overwhelmingly dominated policy formation, overturning even doctrines set forth by 
Lenin. In the post-Stalin era, some dissident perspectives and statements began to be 
tentatively put forward. In 1954, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Malenkov 
“declared that world war in the nuclear age would mean the destruction of world 
civilization.”80 In response to his outspoken views, Malenkov was forced to resign 
several months later. 
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 Soviet leadership both during and after Stalin’s reign subscribed to a theory of 
nuclear deterrence and parity with the United States as the path forward well into the 
1970s.81 The nuclear arms race that defined much of the early Cold War was a result of 
that policy preference. Debates on nuclear policy in the Soviet Union were rarely well 
documented in the historic record, but when they did occur they often occurred through 
military affiliated individuals rather than Soviet Scientists. Military education in the 
U.S.S.R was heavily propagandized and indoctrinating, a tradition that traces its origin to 
the bloody purges of Stalin in the 1930s. One notable exception was Andrei Sakharov’s 
non-proliferation activism. Under the Khrushchev administration, Sakharov began to 
oppose the flagrant violation of a 3-year moratorium on nuclear tests. Despite his 
protests, the test continued as scheduled. Sakharov would also go on to oppose the 
development of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). An ABM only increased 
uncertainty and tension between the nuclear-armed U.S.S.R and the U.S, and its 
development offered no strategic advantage in light of its tension perpetuating effects, but 
again Soviet authorities silenced the internal dissent by refusing to initiate a public debate 
on the matter.82  
 The influence of the nuclear epistemic community in the Soviet path to nuclear 
status is subject to numerous limiting factors. On one hand, it was through policy 
diffusion and selection mechanisms, that the community was able to bring nuclear 
weaponization onto the agenda of the Soviet government in the early 1940s. On the other 
hand the Soviet penchant for centralization and ideological control stifled the 
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development of established sets of nuclear control policy suggestions as observed in the 
American example. Additionally, the forces of international espionage and subterfuge 
were central to the progress of the Soviet nuclear program complementary to the efforts 
of Soviet scientists. The Soviet nuclear program was embedded within the NKVD, an 
organization with a reputation for brutal purges and hyper-efficient dissident detection 
mechanisms. This, combined with memories of the Stalinist purges, chilled the 
development of epistemic policy ‘schools’ to the point where the ability of the 
community to impact policy was almost entirely limited to the technical set of challenges 






Chapter 7: India: The Significance of Tail Fins 
 
 India became a tacit nuclear power on the 18th of May 1974, with the detonation of a 
peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE) device in a test codenamed Pokhran-1.83 India experienced 
proliferation as part of a ‘second-wave’ of states to go nuclear. India did not have to practice 
research and development at a cutting-edge tempo in global war conditions of high uncertainty. 
In fact the first of the Soviet (in 1949) and American (in 1945) nuclear tests actually predate the 
Indian Republic (established 1950). Perhaps in spite of its young age, the nascent state of India 
immediately began to develop its own unique character and political perspectives in regards to its 
nuclear future.  
 The series of events that led to Pokhran-1 began far earlier than 1950 and the formal 
creation of the Indian state. Indian scientists were present for the atomic revelations of the 1930s; 
One Indian scientist in particular, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, would go on to play a foundational 
role in the development of a nuclear India.84 Long before his rise to power however, he was a 
visiting scientist working with many of the western names commonly associated with nuclear 
discoveries such as Fermi and and Bhor. Western xenophobia limited Bhabha’s rise to 
prominence in western institutions as one author notes “The norm of modern science is that it is 
a universal practice: anyone can take part, we are told, as long as they are good enough. But 
these norms had presupposed firm boundaries… [Society] had not expected to find colonial 
scientists in western laboratories…”85 The political and social mechanisms of post-colonialism 
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are commonly used in explaining India’s decision to go nuclear. Regardless the prejudices of 
colonialism were certainly at play in Bhabha’s experience with western scientific institutions. 
 On the 1st of June 1945, Homi Bhabha would found an institution that would become the 
“Tata Institute for Fundamental Research” (TIFR) in Mumbai. Almost a decade later he would 
go on to found the Atomic Energy Establishment, Trombay (AEET) eventually renamed in his 
honor as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). TIFR and BARC would play important 
roles in providing the scientific and technical expertise that helped formulate government 
opinion on nuclear issues by training many of the technocrats that would occupy government 
panels concerning the issue.86 Homi Bhabha held a number of official positions, but none more 
important than his chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC of India, not to be 
confused with the American or the British Atomic Energy Commissions). Bhabha’s role as a 
founder of BARC and TIFR made him a prominent figure overseeing a small but well developed 
epistemic sub-community comprised of BARC-TIFR scientists. 
The Indian AEC is a peculiar institution; the commission’s genesis, history and design 
encapsulate the unique nature of the Indian nuclear program. Homi Bhabha had a heavy hand in 
designing the AEC, he enumerated the highly centralized, small man committee structure in a 
memorandum to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1947.87 The AEC was formally created 
through the Atomic Energy Act of 1948 and was given broad sweeping powers to monopolize 
civilian nuclear energy and material. Despite protests from local governments, asymmetry 
among the reasoning of its supporters and questions regarding the need for secrecy, the act was 
passed by popular vote in the Lok Sabha. The need for secrecy beget the future weaponization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Abraham,	  135.	  





programs of the commission. The AEC was never subject to legislative oversight, even the bill 
was voted on in a rush that broke with established parliamentary protocols.88 When ministers 
questioned the bill’s lack of financial memorandum, a financial analysis document required for 
all bills passing through the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha (Upper and lower houses of Indian 
parliament, respectively) the government responded “it had ‘tried’ to give an estimate of the 
expenses needed by the atomic energy complex for the next few years, but it could not because 
these expenses would take place in the future the speaker’s bizarre and circular ruling was 
accepted by the rest of the House without further question.”89 
The AEC was established through aberrant legislative practices, with support from PM 
Nehru.90 The Atomic Energy Commission was insulated from legislative oversight, reported 
directly to the prime minister and had an effective monopoly of nuclear resources and research in 
India. The pursuit of nuclear technology by the state of India can be explained in a myriad of 
ways. Simple realist arguments point to a nuclear China (as of 1962) as a power that India 
required a nuclear weapon to balance against, adding to the argument that India’s lack of nuclear 
guarantees from major powers gave it inherent incentive to create its own security guarantee.91 
Another explanation points to the practice of state-directed development as a potential motivator 
to nationalize nuclear industry and research. The tenants of SDD include nationalizing certain 
strategic industries and protecting them from international competition, something that the AEC 
with its monopoly was in a position to do. This outlook on strategic sectors can be traced to the 
Blackett Report, delivered in 1948 to the defence ministry of Independent India, stressing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Ibid,	  117.	  	  
89	  Abraham,	  117.	  
90	  Ibid,	  59.	  





“relation between indigenous defence production and national development.”92  This relationship 
would be questioned later during a reconfiguration of the AEC in the Atomic Energy Act of 
1968.  
Underpinning the nuclear debate in India was the question of nationalism, many in Indian 
society linked nuclear status with world power.93 Many MPs during the 1948 and 1968 debates 
came to equate a nuclear enabled India (in civilian or military spheres) with a modern India. 
Nuclear capability, although proposed as a cheap energy solution, was at times seen as an end 
unto itself. Regardless of the debate surrounding the purpose of a nuclear program of India, the 
technical approach to weaponization was tightly handled by the AEC. The 1948 AEC’s 3 man 
committee was entirely comprised of scientists as enumerated in table 6. The same triumvirate of 
scientists would also occupy the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Defence, 
foreshadowing the future of the nuclear program’s implications.  
Table 694 
Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 
Name Occupation 
Homi Bhabha Founder of TIFR, AEET (BARC), Physicist.  
K.S Krishnan Director of National Physics Laboratory 
S.S Bhatnagar Director-general of Council on Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) 
 
 The AEC allowed epistemic community members to have formal positions within 
government, subject only to limitations from the PM. The Atomic Energy acts of 1948 and 1968 
debates were important ‘checks’ where many government powers were surrendered to the AEC. 
A tight-knit group of scientists with sweeping executive powers and beholden only to a 
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beneficent PM office created an environment where the epistemic community had high control 
over the technical practice and overall strategy of India’s nuclear ambitions.  
 The development of the Indian nuclear program into the 1950s was slow and expensive, 
something typical of early civilian nuclear programs. In 1955 a British-supplied enriched 
Uranium reactor went critical, though this was seen as a stepping-stone for the 1956 Canada-
India reactor, U.S (CIRUS). The CIRUS reactor would play a hyper critical role in bringing the 
1974 Pokhran-1 test to fruition.95  
Understanding the intricacies of different reactor styles is important in understanding the 
path to the PNE of 1974. In terms of resource profile, India had a great deal of thorium deposits, 
but was lacking in Uranium deposits. Thorium can be created into a hybrid fuel when ‘blanketed’ 
by a sufficient supply of plutonium, creating Uranium 233 in the process, however this requires a 
complicated 3-phase process, as plutonium (Pu) is not found in nature.96  Thus India needed the 
ability to produce Pu in quantity. Pu was a byproduct of natural and enriched Uranium reactors, 
thus the CIRUS and the British reactor acting as an initial phase were able to provide an 
important prerequisite (Pu stockpiles) towards nuclear self-sufficiency. Thorium-Plutonium 
hybrid reactors, using Pu enriched thorium fuels would in turn produce U-233 which could then 
be used in a final ‘breeder’ reactor that would be able to run completely off the indigenous 
supply of nuclear material being produced in India. Special preparation was taken to 
domestically produce thorium fuel rods before the operationalization of the CIRUS reactor. 
When CIRUS went online and began to produce Pu, the Indian national government could argue 
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that since it had provided input elements (Thorium fuel rods), it had some claim to the output, in 
this case Plutonium.97  
Indian negotiation with Canadian atomic representatives proved successful in casting off 
as many safeguards as possible from CIRUS. Canadian negotiators were unsure of how to 
proceed, during the 1955 purchase of CIRUS, the IAEA was still being negotiated and was not 
an established entity. Thus, in a strange twist of history, the Canadians decided to refrain from 
enabling safeguards opting instead to “remain silent on the provisions of fuel in order to avoid 
the creation of a precedent.”98 The AEC, with an operational CIRUS reactor and aid from states 
such as the U.S, Canada, Great Britain and France were able to begin the production of 
Plutonium, a critical dual-use material required for creating nuclear weapons as well as operating 
a thorium based civilian nuclear program.  
Despite this virtual potential, India would refrain from detonating a PNE for almost 20 
years, and a full blown nuclear test (free of its peaceful pretenses) for another 40 years. This can 
be partially explained through the AEC’s leadership. In 1964 PM Nehru and 1966 Homi Bhabha, 
the ‘old-guard’ responsible for the original inception of the AEC, died. The AEC was left with a 
vacant chairman position, which was eventually occupied by Vikram Sarabhai, a scientist who 
was previously involved in India’s space program. Sarabhai was vigorously opposed to a PNE or 
any weapons program for that matter, and his views often left him at odds with his fellow AEC 
commission members, many of whom saw Sarabhai as an outsider to the BARC-TIFR faculty 
that preferred Chairman Bhabha’s vision to the Ghandian perspectives of Sarabhai.99 Sarabhai 
attempted to reinvigorate the AEC away from insulated and sterile programs of research reactors 
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and resource managing, towards more integrative efforts, in an attempt to bring the civilian 
benefits originally associated with the AEC to actualization. His tenure saw the expansion of gas 
centrifuges for enrichment and the opening of more research reactors in an attempt to establish 
the foundation for an operational and relevant civilian nuclear program. Sarabhai’s tenure of the 
AEC would end on the 30th of December 1971, when he died unexpectedly in his sleep.100  
Leadership of the AEC would be taken over by Homi Sethna, former BARC director, and 
a firm believer in the leadership style of the AEC’s old guard. By the 1970s however a full return 
to the vision first proposed by Bhabha for the AEC was complicated. The ability of the AEC to 
produce a nuclear explosive device had existed since the early 1960s. The debate surrounding the 
creation of a “peaceful nuclear device”, had existed since the AEC’s earliest days, although 
technical ability and political will had prevented its development. Sarabhai was overtly willing to 
explore a nuclear test, despite protest from nuclear states.101 Ultimately the decision to green 
light the AEC’s PNE program fell to PM Indira Ghandi, whom “decreed that the experiment 
should be carried out on schedule for the simple reason that India required such a 
demonstration.”102 
The Pokhran-1 test was green lighted, and successfully executed on the 18th of May 1974. 
The international response to the situation was marked by distrust and disappointment. Indian 
politicians had long snubbed the nuclear controls espoused by the IAEA, and the newly formed 
NPT. They rejected the idea of international nuclear control citing that it was inherently 
discriminatory in how it treated NWS and NNWS. Furthermore, the U.S and the U.S.S.R had 
their own extensive nuclear test regimes in the years prior, setting a precedent for peaceful 
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nuclear tests as a state right. PM Ghandi went to great lengths to convince foreign governments 
that the Pokhran test was purely scientific and any military implications were merely 
‘hypothetical contingency.’103  The justifications used by PM Ghandi were contradictory to her 
father’s (Nehru) position during his tenure as PM whom was open about his inability to 
differentiate between a PNE and a bomb.104 India promoted the Pokhran-1 test as a purely 
civilian application of its nuclear program, stating that the creation of a peaceful nuclear 
explosive device was civilian, contradicting or perhaps inspiring a saying in the non-proliferation 
community: ‘The difference between a peaceful nuclear device and a bomb are the tail fins.’ 
The AEC was of particular importance in the development of the Indian atomic bomb. 
Through close collaboration between PM Nehru and Scientist Homi Bhabha and his cadre of 
TIFR/BARC trained scientists, a culture of pro-proliferation was formed. Though this culture 
would be temporarily debased with the appointment of Sarabhai, the same group of scientists 
would ultimately see Bhabha and Nehru’s nuclear ambitions come to fruition in the PNE test. 
The AEC’s proximity to the PM’s office (a top level decision maker), its tight-knit group of 
scientists and its sweeping executive powers bred conditions that allowed a select faction of 
nuclear scientists to bring great influence to bear on the decision to create the Indian PNE. 
The Epistemic community involved in the Indian program played a different role than the 
American, Soviet or Pakistani communities. The TIFR/BARC perspective held by many AEC 
scientists put Indian nuclear capabilities well ahead of practical integration. The 1950s and 60s 
saw the AEC oversee the construction of several reactors, all while reports made it clear that the 
cost of operation rendered nuclear power inefficient when compared to conventional energy 
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solutions.105 Ultimately the seductive qualities of nuclear capability trumped rational critiques 
(which were heavily suppressed by the secretive nature of the AEC), and India went forward 
with the construction of a nuclear explosive device. Within the insulated confines of the AEC, 
epistemic community members would be able to practice a sort of lop-sided policy innovation, 
selectively allowing for certain policy diffusions and effectively suggest policies to the PM.  
The caveat to the active nature of the AEC as an epistemic community is representative is 
in the exclusivity of its ranks. BARC-TIFR scientists were keen on keeping the AEC a focused 
organization in terms of perspectives, while excluding voices of non-proliferation. If scientists 
such as Bhabha and Sarabhai could be practitioners of the infinite containment school (to 
encapsulate the Indian debate in the language of the American debate 25 years earlier), Homi 
Sethna could be considered the embodiment of the control school counter-argument. This is not 
to say that Homi Sethna was a gentle pacifist, he demonstrated a clear understanding (and 
rejection) of the deterrence based argument when he said that: 
[successful deterrence] is not achieved by exploding a bomb. It means a total 
defence system, a means of delivery in this case. You have to think in terms of 
long-range missiles; it means radar, a high state of electronics, a high state of 
metallurgical and industrial base… India should view this question in relation to 
the sacrifices it is prepared to make viewing it in its totality…. An atomic bomb is 
not going to help our security.106  
 
 It is important to note that these voices of dissent regarding the PNE were present both in 
the legislative and epistemic community. Sarabhai’s tenure as chairman of the AEC ushered in a 
short-lived refocusing of the AEC away from theoretical capabilities towards practical 
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integration and clear aversion to the creation of a PNE.107 This caused considerable friction 
between chairman Sarabhai and the BARC/TIFR scientists that occupied the rest of the 
committee. Despite this fractured consensus on the purpose, funding, and nature of the 
AEC/Indian nuclear program, it was supported time and time again both from a public 
perspective and in legislative hearings. Highlighting the inter-subjectivity of the implications of 
nuclear capability one author points out that nuclear capability “meant a source of cheap 
electrical energy to developmentalists, a means of overcoming neo-colonial domination to 
nationalists, a sign of masculinity and intellectual prowess to scientists, a resource for state 
power to socialists, and in instrument of foreign policy to realists and militarists.”108 The Indian 
experience in proliferation is not simple in its rationale, and India’s path to nuclear status is 
stretched over multiple decades, Prime ministers, and AEC chairmen. In the end however, it can 
be said India went nuclear because of a division of interests. Many sectors of not only the 
epistemic community, but of Indian society itself supported India’s atomic ambitions- but for 
very different and at times paradoxical reasoning. The fact that the epistemic community 
fractured in such an environment, and that one particular fragment (the BARC-TIFR cabal) were 
able to exercise covert yet far reaching control on the Indian nuclear program is a testament to 
the asymmetrical empowerment that epistemic community membership entails, it also makes 
clear- physicists with identical causal understandings of nuclear reactions and their destructive 
potential can come to very different conclusions in regards to its use. 
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Chapter 8: Pakistan: In the Face of Existential Threat 
 
 Pakistan state history is deeply intertwined with that of its sibling states, India and 
Bangladesh. Pakistan gained its independence in August of 1947, in a bloody episode of history 
known as the partition. The bloodshed of the 1947 partition is a complicated microcosm of 
identity politics, local grievances, colonial mismanagement and indiscriminate violence. A 
young Pakistan would not forget the violence, and maintained a dubious sentiment towards 
Indian state progress. Indeed it was Indian military action in the 1965 India-Pakistan war and the 
Indian intervention in the 1971 Pakistani civil war (a war that would give birth to Bangladesh) 
that are cited as the primary motivators behind the Pakistani state’s decision to pursue a nuclear 
option.109  
 The Pakistani state did not always have nuclear ambitions; at one point Pakistan was a 
model citizen of the developing NPR. From its birth in 1947 until the mid-1970s Pakistan 
demonstrated a willingness to cooperate (not just comply) with international standards regarding 
nuclear non-proliferation. These standards however were still developing, a caveat that would 
have broad implications in the 1980s when Abdul Qadeer Khan moved to acquire necessary 
equipment for a weaponization program. This willingness to cooperate is best demonstrated in its 
overtures to India in 1972. The 1972 overture included an offer for the creation of a NWFZ, and 
bilateral entrance into the NPT and Comprehensive safeguard agreements with the IAEA.110 
Pakistan, in parallel to its détente oriented overtures towards the Indian government, would be 
investigating nuclear options and the feasibility of a nuclear weapons program at the behest of 
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Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Understanding what mechanics were at play, and how 
epistemic community members facilitated this weaponization process requires a retracing of 
Pakistani Nuclear developments from their inception. 
 Pakistan set up an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, not to be confused with the 
American, British, or Indian organizations) in 1956 chaired by Dr. Nazir Ahmed a European 
trained physicist. The AEC, prior to the 1965 Indian-Pakistani war, was a neglected institution. 
While it took advantage of technology share programs and attempted to set up reactors purchased 
from foreign firms, it was often shut down by resistance from other sectors of the government- as 
was the case with the 1957 attempted purchase of a Canadian NRX reactor (similar to the CIRUS 
reactor that was so critical to the Indian program).111 One explanation for Pakistan’s disinterest 
in nuclear weapons stems from a realist perspective arguing that Pakistan was still vying for U.S 
security guarantees to handle threats while bolstering its conventional forces, once it became 
clear that U.S guarantees would not prevent Indian interference or aggression, Pakistan 
reoriented accordingly.112  
 In March of 1960, Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani would be appointed chairman of the AEC, 
replacing Dr. Nazir Ahmad. Under Usmani’s tenure the AEC of Pakistan would thrive in laying 
the foundation of a nuclear infrastructure, still purely along civilian dimensions. Usmani was 
able to accomplish this mobilization of support through keen political alliances with numerous 
figures in the Pakistani government, including a young Z.A Bhutto who at the time was a 
minister of atomic energy, and Dr.Abdus Salam (a future Noble Laureate). This uptick in 
momentum is a critical development as one author points out many military and political elites of 
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Pakistan have testified “Pakistan had no intention of taking a nuclear route for military purposes 
during this phase [in the 1960s] as a result of its poor infrastructure and absence of political 
will.”113 
 As stated prior the 1965 war with India provided an intense shock to the Pakistani system 
(as any war would), and put into motion many of the sentiments that would result in a Pakistani 
nuclear bomb. Z.A Bhutto (now a foreign minister) began to pursue a nuclear bomb during 1966, 
even going so far as stating, “even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will have the bomb.”114 
This perspective was met with some resistance, particularly from Dr. Salam and Dr. Usmani of 
the AEC. The Pakistani civil war of 1971, Indian interference in the civil war, and the rise of Z.A 
Bhutto to the office of Prime Minister of Pakistan on the 20th of December 1971 locked in the 
political conditions required for Pakistan to begin its about-face in terms of attitudes towards the 
NPR.  
 Bhutto’s tenure as PM saw several important strategic changes take place in terms of the 
geopolitical outlook of Pakistan. The 1971 civil war saw Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) 
break away from the Pakistani state with the help of Indian intervention. The Pakistani status quo 
realized that the United States was unable or unwilling to provide security protections that would 
effectively deter India from meddling in Pakistani affairs, this was coupled with Bhutto’s ‘pivot’ 
towards the Muslim world which was quick to supply cheap loans and credits to shore up 
Pakistan’s military strength.115 Some of this money would be used to fund future nuclear 
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pursuits; other portions would be dedicated to conventional armed forces, which grew by 70% 
under the Bhutto administration.116 
 The reconfiguration of alliances and the realization of an ‘existential threat’ posed to 
Pakistan from Indian military strength, led to the Multan meeting on the 20th of December 
1972.117 The Multan meeting included 283 Pakistani nuclear scientists who PM Bhutto asked to 
create a bomb within 3 years. It is important to note that just 2 months earlier in September 1972, 
Pakistan had launched its NWFZ/NPT bilateral membership deal to India, in light of the Multan 
meeting it is clear that this was a last-ditch effort to explore détente options with India. The 1974 
Pokhram-1 test by India sealed the deal in terms of Pakistan’s willingness to pursue nuclear 
weapons. The technical path to weaponization however had still to be decided.  
 Pakistan performed somewhat of a tight-rope act in acquiring nuclear equipment without 
overtly alerting the NPR as to the Pakistani nuclear ambition. Part of this avoidance calculus was 
choosing what fissile material was appropriate for a Pakistani nuclear weapon. Pakistan could 
essentially choose between a Plutonium-based weapon (which would require expensive and 
attention-attracting reprocessing plants) or an enriched Uranium-based weapon which would 
require enrichment facilities. Pakistan would pursue both routes in parallel up until the success of 
the enriched Uranium camp. A.Q Khan, began meeting with PM Bhutto in mid-1975, providing 
feasibility reports and offers of overseeing the Uranium enrichment effort.118 
 A.Q Khan is widely considered to be the father of the Pakistani bomb, without his 
contacts and expertise the bomb could never have been completed on the time scale it was. Part 
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of what made Khan such a valuable asset to the Pakistani nuclear program (besides his overt 
willingness to construct a bomb) was his contacts with western nuclear commercial firms. Before 
his return to Pakistan in the 1970s, A.Q Khan worked for the Dutch engineering firm Fysisch 
Dynamisch Onderzoek (FDO or Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory in English) designing 
centrifuges (a critical component for U-235 production).119 
 Once the political will of Pakistan could be focused on sustaining efforts to weaponize, 
the only obstacles were the acquisition of fissile material and nuclear equipment by the Pakistani 
state. At this point A.Q Khan and his supporting scientists were able to take advantage of certain 
facets of the technology sharing and commercial nuclear equipment firms. One particularly 
poignant act of technology transfer occurred in 1973 when a Pakistani nuclear scientist visiting 
the United States on business with the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) was 
able to access Manhattan Project documents from the library of congress.120 To find out how to 
build a bomb, Pakistani scientists literally went to the library. A.Q Khan’s network of 
commercial firms was supplemented with supposed Chinese Military assistance, though many 
aspects of this military assistance such as whether or not it included fissile material, are still 
hotly contested.121 Pakistan was unable to create an indigenous nuclear weapons program 
without this transnational contacts, this was clear well before its nuclear program went public as 
one author writes in 1978 “The likely political consequences of a limited Indian nuclear capacity 
are more obscure. Undoubtedly Pakistan would attempt to acquire weapons of its own, although 
it could not do this without outside assistance.”122 
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A.Q Khan continued his covert purchases under the leadership of not only Prime Minister 
Bhutto, but General Zia-ul-Haq who came to power in a military coup in 1977. It was General 
Zia who ultimately green lighted the final steps for the AEC in creating a Pakistani nuclear bomb 
and a subsequent ‘cold-test’ in May of 1981.123 Another 7 years would pass before Zia admitted 
Pakistan had obtained nuclear deterrence and another 17 years before Pakistan would openly test 
nuclear weapons.  
The Pakistani experience in proliferation is complex and the record social scientists have 
regarding the historical events are incomplete. A short analysis of the behavior of the epistemic 
community in the Pakistani nuclear arena reveals that it remained subservient to the state through 
all of its varied positions of the desirability of nuclear deterrence. In the 1950s and 60s the tenure 
of Dr. Ahmed and Usmani mimicked the political will of the times (or at the least paralleled it) 
with an unflinching desire to implement safeguards and maintain a healthy open civilian nuclear 
program. However the will of PM Bhutto, and his open request of the scientific community for a 
bomb during the Multan meeting reveal that the desire for a weapon in the Pakistani case was 
exogenous to the epistemic community. It was only after Bhutto’s open request that scientists 
such as A.Q Khan came forth to facilitate the nuclear weapons program. The Pakistani 
government performed a type of policy request (if an opposite of policy selection can be 
expressed as such) to the epistemic community to produce a weapon. Perhaps owing to the 
perceived threat from India or the careful selection of the 283 scientists present at the Multan 
meeting, the community obliged and began diligently working on weaponization using the tools 
and materials at their disposal, and acquiring commercially what they did not have.  
 






Chapter 9: Study Findings 
 
 This study, through the examination of existing historical accounts in the literature, 
examined the role of epistemic communities in facilitating proliferation policy. These case 
studies included the American, Soviet, Indian and Pakistani experiences in proliferation. In each 
example an indigenous epistemic community was involved in the formation of a national nuclear 
weapons program and exercised varying degrees of control over the program’s execution. 
In the American example, the community of American and European Physicists were 
able to alert the government to the implications of certain advancements in Physics in the late 
1930s. This correspondence between physicists and governmental officials are examples of 
Policy Innovation (the realization that Uranium fission reactions can be used for a weapon) 
within the epistemic community, policy diffusion (as news of the newly tenable research track 
spread internationally via an article published in Nature), and policy selection in the form of 
lobbying the government for a Manhattan Project style weapons program. Even after the 
beginning of the nuclear age, epistemic community members in the infinite control school of 
thought supported vertical proliferation, with the assumption that a sufficiently destructive 
hydrogen bomb may deter Soviet aggression. These early machinations in facilitating and 
encouraging nuclear proliferation were however done in a type of ‘norm’ vacuum. A similar 
condition would exist for the Soviet experience albeit coupled with a different domestic regime 
as well.  
The Soviet epistemic community attempted to alert its government in 1939 and 1940 to 





its espionage efforts in the NKVD, but also through the persistence of Georgy Flyorov who saw 
fit to send multiple letters to the Government and ultimately to Stalin, requesting further 
government research be undertaken. Interestingly enough it was a form of silent policy diffusion 
between Western Scientists and their Soviet counterparts that first brought the realization of the 
implications of Uranium fission to the mind of Georgy Flyorov, who then realized that Western 
journals were no longer publishing on fission phenomena. However despite their aloofness and 
loyalty to the Soviet system, the scientists involved in the Russian weaponization program under 
NKVD administration were rarely given the opportunity to speak their minds on how the weapon 
ought to be used and how the USSR ought to respond to overtures by the US. This instead was 
left to Stalin and later the factions of the Politburo to decide, leaving the epistemic community 
out of the debate. The few times that the Soviet epistemic community stepped up in an attempt to 
spark some kind of public discussion on Soviet policy, it was quickly halted by Soviet authorities 
as unacceptable dissent. 
In the Indian proliferation experience an analysis of the highly independent nature of the 
Indian AEC and the influence exerted by figures such as Dr. Bhabha or Dr. Sethna helped 
highlight the ability to epistemic community to successfully practice policy suggestion regarding 
nuclear weaponization. In addition the underlying philosophy of the Indian epistemic community 
paralleled the western strands of the control and containment schools, albeit with very different 
justifications and practices. The labeling of the Pokhran-1 test as a PNE is central to the 
peculiarity of certain segments of the Indian nuclear epistemic community. From a western 
control school perspective, the act of detonating a nuclear device inherently violates the norms of 
non-proliferation (as well as several test-ban treaties). From the Indian perspective there was no 





institutions, instead it was subject to the oversight of the civilian executive government, namely 
the PM’s office and the AEC member-body. The AEC also played an important part in focusing 
epistemic member influence at the cost of diversity of opinion. The AEC was largely staffed by 
BARC-TFIR scientists who subscribed to certain notions regarding the Indian nuclear program, 
notions that were at one moment challenged by the tenure of Dr. Sarabhai, but only momentarily.    
In the Pakistani examination very different relationships existed between the national 
government and the epistemic community. Pakistan itself went through a wide range of policy 
positions regarding its stance on cooperating with the NPR. The Pakistani AEC mimicked these 
stances, and essentially facilitated whatever the government requested (or was willing to fund). 
The epistemic community had very little part in the debate behind weaponization, one man 
essentially made the decision: Prime Minister A.Z Bhutto. The effects of institutionalized policy 
diffusion, such as the sharing of nuclear civilian technology and the bilateral negotiation of 
safeguards on the individual reactors of the civilian nuclear program all gave windows for the 
epistemic community as encapsulated by the Pakistani AEC to shape policy preferences to match 
technical feasibility. The Pakistani epistemic community was able to leverage international 
contacts through the network of A.Q Khan, certainly duping many firms into facilitating illegal 
behavior. 
In retrospect on the aforementioned historical surveys, several aspects of this study’s 
initial hypothesis can be re-evaluated. The first hypothesis, that Epistemic communities  acting 
as gate keeper significantly influence policy preferences of states through their analysis and 
recommendation of cost calculations for both security and monetary dimensions, was found to be 





and India early initiatives by epistemic community members were able to spark interest in 
government research, in part out of the description of definition and cost given to the state by 
epistemic community members. In the Pakistani and Soviet experience, the state itself had 
insight to the nuclear weaponization process through espionage (for the Soviets) and technology 
sharing agreements and the U.S Library of Congress (for the Pakistanis). The Soviet and the 
Pakistani experience included pressures from the uncertainty surrounding the nuclear ambitions 
of rival states which may have propelled Soviet/Pakistani governments to start weaponization 
programs in a manner not directly related to epistemic influencing mechanics.  
The second hypothesis of this study, that epistemic communities are constrained in their 
ability to influence policy preferences of states to simply informing on pre-determined state 
preferences was found to be the case the Soviet and Pakistani example. The Soviet government 
was always in sole control of the decision to move forward with a nuclear weapons program. The 
epistemic community in the USSR, once coupled to the government project, was largely there for 
technical management of the project, leaving policy formation completely up to the Soviet 
authorities. Similar relationships existed in the Pakistani setting, where the Pakistani AEC was 
subservient to the policy preferences of the state and did little to change the status quo.  
Finally the third hypothesis, that epistemic communities can significantly influence 
policy preference but only under conditions of great uncertainty, was partially confirmed. In all 
examples save for the Indian proliferation experience, there was credible nuclear threats 
emanating from another state towards the weaponizing state. India however did not face an 
overwhelming nuclear arsenal out of Pakistan, and if Indian weaponization was in response to 





weaponize and the insecurity motivating this decision may stem from a sense of nuclear 
inadequacy on a global scale, rather than on a bilateral balance of power with a rival. During the 
1950s and 60s India was a fast developing nation that was cautious to associate itself too heavily 
with either the USSR or the US- opting instead to represent a non-aligned ‘third path’. As a 
leader in the non-aligned movement, India may have felt that it ought to have a nuclear weapon 
in order to justify its position as the lynchpin of a ‘third’ faction in the cold war. The motivations 
for the weapons program or peaceful nuclear explosive program was thus not in the name of 
national security, but rather with the aim of cementing national prestige with weaponization 
capability. 
This study illuminated several problematic aspects of the epistemic community model. 
Namely it demonstrated that the mechanics of the epistemic community, as originally described 
by Peter Haas, may be more complex than initially thought. Earlier examples of epistemic 
community studies observed community behavior around accomplishing a singular policy goal 
(pollution control in the Mediterranean, arms control between the US and USSR etc), but my 
case studies have demonstrated that these mechanics may be used in two opposing directions at 
the same time, causing a contradictory upset in the cohesiveness of epistemic community policy 
preferences. This is highlighted in the contention between the American nuclear epistemic 
approaches to arms control philosophies (comprised of the control, finite containment and 
infinite containment schools) and their underlying assumptions regarding the causal effects of 
proliferation on global stability. 
Another issue of the epistemic community framework arises from its inclusion of 





government complicates analysis of the influencing power of epistemic communities. When a 
decision was made in the Interim Committee to recommend nuclear use, how can one readily 
distinguish between Chairman Stimson’s approval based on the information given to him by the 
nuclear epistemic community, or his own personal experience/outlook as a wartime government 
official?  
Cultural asymmetries also impacted the positioning and treatment of epistemic 
communities in each case study. Though epistemic communities may share certain features and 
practices both domestically and with their international counterparts, they are differently 
received in their home states. India and the Soviet Union both had societies that treated western 
science with some degree of suspicion or discrimination. In the Soviet Union there was the 
division between the science of capitalist states and the ‘socialist science’ practiced in tandem 
with the doctrines of the Soviet state. India meanwhile instilled a certain nationalist sanctity on 
its own nuclear scientists, believing them to be apt tools for nationalist ambitions to break away 
from colonial dependence and domination through the benefits of nuclear energy and even 
weapons.  
Finally, when examining epistemic communities within nuclear proliferation issue 
arenas, issues relating to security clearance and government affiliation arise. For example, 
Edward Teller of the U.S epistemic community believed in the tenants of infinite containment 
and found the H-bomb a desirable research track to undertake from the U.S perspective, while 
his colleague Robert Oppenheimer vehemently opposed its construction. When the Truman 
administration decided to continue Teller’s work on the project- but not Oppenheimer- an 





would turn to NGOs to spread his message while Teller would continue his work in the US 
government. Both individuals were epistemic community members, but once Teller entered into 
cooperation with the United States H-bomb project it is difficult to tell if his epistemic 
credentials were part of the influencing factors behind the decision to move forward or his status 
as a willing collaborator to government policy was responsible. Furthermore while 
Oppenheimer’s non-proliferation work is surely an act of epistemic community policy support, 
how can one readily explain Teller’s support of vertical proliferation under the epistemic model? 
Is the Epistemic community (through Teller and his cooperative colleagues) truly supporting 
vertical proliferation by the United States? Or has Teller left the realm of epistemics in favor of 
becoming a government scientist? What are the boundaries of an epistemic community member 
and a government official? If they overlap, how can we distinguish them?  
The concept of epistemic communities remains a useful neo-liberal institutionalist 
approach for understanding the impact and role of scientific/academic groups in certain issue 
areas. Nuclear proliferation is an issue area with special properties when compared to more 
mundane issue areas. What is clear is that epistemic communities will play an important role in 
the development of global governance mechanics. What that role will be, and what content 
epistemic communities will fulfill the role with remains to be seen. Some important avenues for 
further research could include: how do national government or societal factors impede or 
facilitate epistemic community influence? What domestic factors are required for epistemic 
communities to form? What are the conditions and focuses of intra-epistemic community debate 
and is intra-epistemic debate impacted by external actors? What role will these communities play 






Chapter 10: On the Future of Epistemic Communities 
 
 This study has revealed a certain fluid nature of epistemic communities, one that displays 
wide variance in policy suggestions as practiced by epistemic communities towards their home 
governments. This fluid nature is such that epistemic communities seem solid within it’s inner 
circles, but when its ‘frontiers’ are examined in the form of epistemic community members 
holding positions within governments the clarity of the theory breaks down as exogenous 
decision making capabilities are mixed into the epistemic community member base leading to an 
imbalance in the influencing ability of some epistemic community members over others and by 
default an imbalance of the influencing ability of the perspectives those members have. This 
inflation, taken to an extreme causes epistemic communities to fracture and results in wider 
variances in policy suggestions as espoused by the community. The tumultuous relationship 
between Oppenheimer and Teller may be the most dramatic representation of these epistemic-
fracturing mechanics. Nuclear Politics is an arena shaded with a particularly dramatic dimension, 
as the stakes can be set quite high when discussing the implications of thermonuclear warheads 
deployed with all their macabre global delivery systems. This high-cost of failure may play a role 
in inducing the fractures observed in epistemic communities during proliferation events. Other 
issue areas such as pollution control, the regulation of global public goods, may operate with far 
smoother internal contentions and avoid the epistemic-fracturing effect as witnessed in the 
nuclear arena.  
In a certain sense the nuclear discoveries in the 1930s began an everlasting threat of 





is inherently dual-use. Nuclear physicists and the epistemic communities they represent gain 
authority in non-proliferation debates from their technical understanding of nuclear physics, but 
it is this same knowledge that allows nuclear weapons to be created in the first place. 
Extrapolating this effect into society-wide levels of analysis it is this dual-use knowledge 
empowering nuclear epistemic groups that is the animating force behind both: the weapons 
program that manufactures nuclear weapons, and the sagacity to understand the self-annihilating 
scope of nuclear warfare.  
The non-use of nuclear weapons is a self-preserving exercise for humanity. The dawn of 
the nuclear age was a sobering moment, where humanity faced its own capacity for self-
destruction coupled to its addiction to force projection. Humanity has the capacity to practice 
restraint in regards to nuclear weapons. Besides the twin nuclear strikes on Japan, there has never 
again been another instance of nuclear warfare. Exercising and developing this self-preserving 
restraint is required for humanity’s future survival. Nuclear weapons will one day be eclipsed by 
an even more destructive as yet ‘un-invented’ weapon system. The debate surrounding weapons 
of mass destruction is destined to go on as long as human technological innovation occurs, which 
ideally will in turn parallel human existence. Thus examining and improving our understandings 
of nuclear proliferation as well as non-proliferation events is prudent in light of our future as a 
species. 
 Another important detail to note regarding this study and the debate surrounding weapons 
of mass destruction is the role of women. All of the epistemic community members mentioned 
prior are men, but women have surely played a role in these developments. However the historic 
record (reflecting the outdated values of the time) rarely enumerates the contributions and efforts 





ironic when one considers that chemist Clara Immerwahr, wife of Fritz Haber the “father of 
chemical weapons,” was one of the first to protest the use of scientific knowledge in the 
production of exotic weapons of mass destruction- in a sense becoming the founder of science’s 
input on the modern arms control debate. 
In the interest of improving the ability of epistemic communities to exercise greater 
vigilance against nuclear proliferation, the following policy suggestions can be considered: as a 
preliminary ‘soft’ measure, scientists training in nuclear physics or any field that could be 
weaponized (this includes chemical and biological weapons), should undergo some form of 
ethics training, specifically on the horrors that weaponization brings to bear. Harder, less 
attractive measures, could include monitoring individuals with sufficient training, doubtless this 
is already practiced. Finally, constant public discussion and the reinforcement of the non-
proliferation norm in parallel with disarmament efforts are clearly the path forward for 
preserving humanity’s future. The mechanics behind these efforts will be partially played out in 
epistemic communities, understanding the relevant factors behind their influencing ability may 









 The following is the full text of the Einstein-Szilard Letter and G. Flyorov letter that were 
central to the development of the American and Soviet weapons programs. Special thanks is in 
order to my Russian colleagues for their aide in searching for and translating the Flyorov letter, 
which has proven to be widely unavailable in English form. Together these letters represent, in 
some sense, the diffusion of ideas, concepts and policies from epistemic communities to their 
host government. In addition these letters are of historic importance as they helped bring about 




Old Grove Rd. 
Nassau Point 
Peconic, Long Island 
 
August 2nd 1939 
 
F.D Roosevelt 





Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in 
manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important 
source of energy in the immediate future. Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem 
to call for watchfulness and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the administration. I believe 
therefore that it is my duty to bring to your attention the following facts and recommendations: 
In the course of the last four months it has been made probable -- through the work of Joliot in 
France as well as Fermi and Szilard in America -- that it may become possible to set up a nuclear 
chain reaction in a large mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and large quantities 
of new radium like elements would be generated. Now it appears almost certain that this could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





be achieved in the immediate future. 
This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable -- 
though much less certain -- that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be 
constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well 
destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory. However, such bombs 
might very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by air. 
The United States has only very poor [illegible] of uranium in moderate quantities. There is some 
good ore in Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of Uranium 
is Belgian Congo. 
In view of this situation you may think it desirable to have some permanent contact maintained 
between the Administration and the group of physicists working on chain reactions in America. 
One possible way of achieving this might be for you to entrust with this task a person who has 
your confidence and who could perhaps serve in an unofficial capacity. His task might comprise 
the following: 
a) To approach Government Departments, keep them informed of the further development, and 
out forward recommendations for Government action, giving particular attention to the problem 
of uranium ore for the United States; 
b) To speed up the experimental work, which is at present being carried on within the limits of 
the budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds, if such funds be required, through his 
contacts with private persons who are willing to make a contribution for this cause, and perhaps 
also by obtaining the co-operation of industrial laboratories which have the necessary equipment. 
I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian 
mines, which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early action might perhaps be 
understood on the ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of State, Von Weishlicker 
[sic], is attached to the Kaiser Wilheim Institute in Berlin where some of the American work on 
uranium is now being repeated. 











Georgy Flyorov’s Letter to Stalin125 
Dear Joseph Vissarionovich,  
 
           It’s been 10 months since the beginning of the war; and I feel like and I really have 
become a person who is trying to bang my head against a brick wall. Where am I wrong? Am I 
overestimating the power of uranium? No, I don’t think so...  
 
         The solution of this problem will lead to the creation of a nuclear bomb, equivalent to a 20-
30 tonnes of explosive material, enough to destroy either Berlin or Moscow, depending on who 
has it first... 
 
         There are reports that this issue seems to be heavily engaged in abroad. However, this 
information is either being silenced from you or simply ignored; all they say here is that uranium 
is a fiction and want to postpone this research till the war is over. This is Professor Ioffe’s 
positioin, but his is wrong... I know Professor Ioffe good enough to confirm that he knows what 
he is saying... However, in this case his position is almost equivalent to a crime.  
 
          Here I am attaching my letter to comrade Kaftanov. I was very happy to receive 
Kaftanov’s explanations. It is not common among academics to stay quiet, especially when it 
concerns the state security issues. However, neither my personal conversations with Professor 
Ioffe nor the letter to Kaftanov is reaching the goal, everything is ignored. I have not received a 
single response from comrade Kaftanov to my letter and five telegrams. During the discussion of 
the Academy of Sciences workplan, they would discuss everything but uranium...  
 
           Do you know, Joseph Vissarionovich, what their main argument against uranium is? - "It 
is too good to be true. You should not wait such a gift from the nature." So I am asking you to 
give me an opportunity to demonstrate that the difference between a human and an animal is 
exactly that a man is able to challenge the nature and get everything he needs from it... 
 
            I believe that in order to address this problem it is necessary to set up a meeting with the 
following scientists: Ioffe, Fersman, Vavilov, Khlopin, Kapitsa; scientist Leipunskii from the 
Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, professors Landau, Alihanov, Artsimovich, Frenkel, 
Kyrchatov, Khariton, Zeldovich, Dr. Migdal, Dr. Gurevich... I am asking for 1 hour and 30 
minutes to speak. It would be preferable if you could attend, Joseph Vissarionovich, or at least 
someone on your behalf. 
 
           This is my last letter, after which I will only wait until Germany, England, or the US 
creates its own nuclear bomb. And the consequences will be so significant that none will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





remember to blame professor Ioffe for ignoring this opportunity. This is being ignored so 
skillfully that we won’t even have actual evidence to blame professor Ioffe anyway – he has 
never officially declared that the creation of the nuclear bomb is impossible. Nevertheless, it 
appears that the general thought is that it is fiction.  
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